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Summary 
Rural poverty is an important and persistent phenomenon among the ACP countries of 
the Caribbean region. Agriculture is an important generator of employment and foreign 
exchange, but for many countries it is a weak and declining sector, notwithstanding 
recent decades of promotion of non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs) as a 
development strategy. While there have been some successes in specific commodity 
chains, for many Caribbean ACP states both export agriculture and food self-sufficiency 
have lagged. Natural capital resources are limited and agroclimatic factors make 
production risky. Institutional development such as phytosanitary controls, levels of 
producer organization and management, and capital investment are low, and significant 
competition in regional markets from better endowed neighbors creates challenging 
economic conditions, despite significant trade preferences. Moreover, development 
strategies for agriculture have been delinked from other economic sectors such as 
tourism and finance, creating sectoral ‘silos’ and exacerbating already adverse food trade 
balances. 
 
Opportunities to enhance poor producers’ participation in value chains are considered. 
This report reviews experiences in the Caribbean Basin – Caribbean states as such, plus 
Central and South American states bordering the Caribbean Sea - using illustrations of 
strengths and weaknesses among ACP countries. Opportunities and threats arising from 
the strategy of non-traditional agricultural export promotion are identified, drawing also 
on examples of regional competitors to ACP countries within the ‘American hemisphere’. 
An extensive literature is cited, and secondary data sources are used throughout. Three 
commodity chain case studies are presented against which to benchmark a range of 
regional experiences in agricultural development. Attention is drawn to the lack of formal 
evidence to show that commodity, or value, chain approaches have a strong poverty 
reduction focus even where commercial strategies and linkages with the private sector 
have been successfully established. 
 
The report concludes by summarizing lessons learnt: 
 
• Commodity chains must be considered within the context of agricultural systems as a 
whole. Development strategies and interventions must acknowledge that smallholder 
agricultural systems are complex, diverse, and risk-prone. Simple commodity chain 
selection and promotion strategies are unlikely to tackle poverty at the farm level. 
• For successful agricultural development, it is necessary but insufficient to identify 
precise market demand opportunities: supply constraints must be addressed. The 
supply capacity depends on resolving fundamental structural problems and 
uncertainties about land tenure; an adequate natural resources base; scale of 
enterprise; human, organizational and technological assets; and public and 
institutional infrastructure, including product quality control and enhancement 
systems. 
• Agricultural development requires adequate linkage with related and supporting 
sectors: the labor market; input supplies; finance; business development and 
knowledge sectors. 
• A ‘sectoral silo’ focus on export strategies has led to the neglect of other opportunities, 
such as local food markets, import substitution and the tourism sector.  
• The poverty reduction benefits of specific strategies cannot be assumed. While value 
chain approaches to smallholder inclusion are notching up successes in the region and 
elsewhere, the poverty reduction impacts at community and household levels cannot 
be assumed. 
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• Producers face considerable barriers to entry into high value/high standards 
agricultural systems, whether for export or domestic consumption. The poorest 
smallholders are least likely to implement strategies of upgrading, novelty and 
innovation to be able to overcome such barriers and create sustainable competitive 
advantages. 
• A fundamental question for the EU-ACP program is to consider whether 
o to support direct action by the public sector and NGOs through selected 
commodity interventions, or  
o to promote private sector-driven and demand-driven initiatives through 
creating and a coherent and entrepreneurial policy framework integrating 
related and supporting sectors. 
In fact, there is a need for a judicious balance and apportioning of responsibilities and 
actions between private and public sector stakeholders which is likely to vary between 
ACP states. 
• Major competitors and major markets are to be found within the Caribbean Region 
and other parts of the Americas. Development initiatives need to be formulated within 
the regional political and economic context, and coordinated with other regional 
interventions. 
 
Among the limitations to this report are the need to draw lessons from diverse situations, 
thereby incurring the risk or over-generalization; and also that this was a UK desk-based 
review without primary data collection. 
 
As a postscript, we note that the current critical context of world food markets adds 
significance to debates about poverty reduction and food security, even though a 
thorough analysis is not yet reflected in the literature: rural poverty reduction will be 
affected variously by the formulation of strategies to produce for domestic and regional 
food markets and for high-value global export markets, and the evolution of trends in 
global commodity markets. 
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1 Development context in the Caribbean 
With few exceptions, poverty continues to be an important issue throughout the 
Caribbean (Table 1.1). Moreover, there is a general consensus that Caribbean poverty is 
concentrated in the rural sector. For example, in St. Lucia the proportion of urban and 
rural populations in poverty was 16% and 30%, respectively. Rural poverty was also 
prominent in other small island states, including Grenada, St. Vincent, and St. Kitts. 
DFID (2001) concludes that poverty in Jamaica is chiefly a rural problem: 69% of poor 
people live outside the towns. Moreover, rural poverty in Jamaica has been declining less 
rapidly than urban poverty, and can be particularly severe in remote areas. In the case 
of Belize, the Country Poverty Assessment (2002) revealed that 33% of the population 
fell below the poverty line (based on expenditures for food and non-food items). The 
rural areas had 42.5% of their households living below the poverty line, while the urban 
areas had 20.6%. Of those defined as poor, 13.4% were deemed to be ‘extremely poor’. 
In the case of Guyana, the IMF (2002) concludes: ‘Guyana’s future economic growth and 
poverty reduction depend heavily on agriculture and rural development.’ Throughout the 
Caribbean, rural areas tend to have poor roads; the residents live in poorer quality 
housing, and have inadequate access to basic services such as potable water, electricity, 
sanitation, transportation, education, and health care. In other respects, heterogeneity is 
a characteristic of the rural Caribbean. 
 
While the agricultural sector remains an important generator of employment and foreign 
exchange throughout much of the Caribbean, its overall contribution to national 
development has been declining, even with preferential market access to both North 
America and European markets. The agricultural and food trade gaps in the region 
widened significantly during the 1980s and then contracted in the 1990s due to an 
increase in export orientation. Since the mid-1990s export performance has declined, 
while imports have increased further. The overall performance of the agricultural sector 
varies markedly among the various Caribbean ACP countries3, based on agroclimatic 
conditions, total land available, and the overall structure of the economy (eg importance 
of tourism). Among the Caribbean ACP countries, there is considerable variation in terms 
of land area, population and economy. The combined area of the two largest countries 
(Guyana and Suriname) is more than double the combined area of all the other 
Caribbean ACP countries (Table 1.2). The combined area of the seven smallest countries 
(Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Barbados, St. Vincent, Granada and St. Kitts), at 3,228 
km sq, is seven times smaller than the land area of Belize – the smallest of the mainland 
countries. With the exception the Dominican Republic and Haiti, population numbers do 
not exceed 1 million, and in limited cases, do not exceed 100,000 (eg Dominica, Antigua, 
Grenada and St. Kitts).  
 
                                          
3 The 15 Caribbean ACP countries are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Table 1.1 compares the human development indices for 
countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. 
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Table 1.1 Human development index for selected Central American and 
Caribbean countries (2005) 
Country HDI Rank4 HDI value5  
Barbados 31 0.892 
Costa Rica 48 0.846 
Bahamas 49 0.845 
Cuba 51 0.838 
Saint Kitts/Nevis 54 0.821 
Trinidad/Tobago 59 0.814 
Panama 62 0.812 
Dominica 71 0.798 
Saint Lucia 72 0.795 
Colombia 75 0.791 
Dominican Republic 79 0.779 
Belize 80 0.778 
Grenada 82 0.777 
Suriname 85 0.774 
Saint Vincent/Grenadines 93 0.761 
Guyana 97 0.750 
Jamaica 101 0.736 
Nicaragua 110 0.710 
Honduras 115 0.700 
Guatemala 118 0.689 
Haiti 146 0.529 
 
 
In most Caribbean countries, development of the agriculture sector is important for 
sustaining traditional resource use and environmental stability, diversifying the local 
economy (eg reducing food imports, promoting alternative tourism), and achieving 
progress towards poverty reduction (McElroy & Albuquerque 1990). The contribution of 
agriculture to GDP in the region varies widely, from a high of 66% in Haiti to a low of 
0.6% in Trinidad. States where the agriculture sector is relatively small include: the 
Bahamas, Saint Kitts, Jamaica, Antigua, and Barbuda. In most cases, where agriculture 
is important, the low contribution of agriculture to national GDP reflects the emergence 
of tourism and financial service sectors in the 1960s and 1970s. Overall, Caribbean 
agriculture continues to be characterized by an overall high dependence on a few export 
commodities for the majority of export earnings, such as bananas and sugar, and in 
most cases, production of these exports has been declining or stagnant since the 1980s, 
due in part to reductions in import quotas and increased extra-regional competition. On 
the other hand, in several cases, agriculture remains vitally important as a source of 
export earnings and employment; these include: Guyana, Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Belize, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent.  
                                          
4 Out of a total of 177 countries included in the rankings. 
5  HDI measures the average achievements in a given country based on three dimensions of ‘human 
development’: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a ‘decent’ standard of living (for more details, see 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/). 
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Table 1.2 Selected indicators of size and wealth for Caribbean ACP countries 
Country Land 
area 
(sq km) 
Population 
(1,000x) 
Per capita 
GDP at 
PPP  
(US$) 
% 
contribution of 
agriculture to 
GDP 
Guyana 196,850 769 5,300 35.2 
Suriname 161,470 471 7,800 8.0 
Dominican Republic 48,380 9,366 9,200 17.0 
Haiti 27,560 8,707 1,900 66.0 
Belize 22,806 294 7,800 22.5 
Jamaica 10,831 2,780 4,800 5.0 
Bahamas 10,070  306 22,700 3.0 
Trinidad/Tobago 5,128 1,057 21,700 0.6 
Dominica 754 72 3,800 17.7 
Saint Lucia 606 171 4,800 21.7 
Antigua/Barbuda 443 70 10,900 3.8 
Barbados 431 281 19,700 6.0 
Saint Vincent/Grenadines 389 118 3,600 26.0 
Grenada 344 90 3,900 5.4 
Saint Kitts/Nevis 261 39 8,200 3.5 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2007) 
 
Export diversification was adopted throughout the region, as well as in Central America, 
during the 1980s as the dominant strategy for agricultural development, mainly in 
response to economic and political crises. However, overall results have been mixed: 
nontraditional agricultural export sectors, such as organic juice in Belize, fresh 
vegetables and fruits in the Dominican Republic and ethnic foods in Jamaica have been 
established and enjoyed defined periods of high growth, but overall they remain 
vulnerable to changes in preferential trade agreements, sanitary and phytosanitary 
challenges, increased extra-regional competition, and small domestic markets, among 
other factors. Responses by individual island governments and regional agricultural 
research and extension institutes have generally emphasized mitigating natural and 
economic constraints and ignored longer-term institutional and structural difficulties. 
Governments have specialized in the provision of subsidized inputs (seeds and fertilizers), 
mechanized services (plowing and harvesting) and protectionism, and in efforts to 
centralize crop marketing and distribution. With few exceptions, however, these efforts 
have been too limited in scope to effectively address the diseconomies of small farm size, 
chronic natural constraints and the massive sectoral wage imbalances unleashed by the 
emergence of the finance and tourism industries.  
Objectives and methodology  
This review aims to inform the process of project strategy formulation, as mandated in 
the European Union-African, Caribbean, Pacific States (EU-ACP) All Agricultural 
Commodities Programme 6 , by focusing on successes and limitations of different 
approaches in Caribbean basin ACP countries and regional competitors to linking 
smallholders with growing and higher-value agricultural markets. Recommendations are 
derived from critical analysis of previous strategies by both public and private sector and 
their related impacts on agricultural development and rural poverty in ACP Caribbean 
countries. In addition to a critical review of the literature related to agricultural 
development strategies, in general, and in the Caribbean, in particular, we present 
detailed case studies of strategies for linking smallholders to markets for non-traditional 
                                          
6 The general objective of the EU-ACP All Agricultural Commodities Programme is to improve incomes for 
producers from traditional or other agricultural commodities and reduce income vulnerability at both product 
and macro level. 
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agricultural exports (NTAEs). Cases were selected to capture variation in terms of: 
institutional arrangements, overall investment requirements, and risks and limitations. 
Case studies are developed primarily based on secondary information collected from 
various academic sources (journals, monographs), the gray literature (reports from 
businesses, NGOs, bi-lateral donors, and development banks), and internet sources 
(newspapers, discussion fora, and websites), with particular focus on: 
 
1. Value chain development  
2. Impacts of non-traditional agriculture export promotion 
3. Collective enterprise development for processing and niche market penetration  
4. Political-legal framework, including development strategies and policies 
5. Local market development, including ‘pro-poor’ tourism.  
 
The scope of the report is wider than those countries included in the CARIFORUM which 
was created in 1992 for the purpose of coordinating and monitoring the delivery and 
planning of European Development Fund (EDF) resources to the region. The linkages 
between the EU and the region have recently been extended by the signing of the 
Economic Partnership Agreement in December 2007. Nevertheless, the rich experience 
of Central America in non-traditional export promotion and the similarities in the 
development context between Central America and the Caribbean, much can be learnt 
from regional competitors. Similarities among ACP and other countries in the region are 
not confined to the relatively small scale and level of development of the economies, the 
reliance on smallholder production, and agroclimatic factors underpinning the rural 
economy, but also economic factors such as participation in regional trade and 
competition in product and services markets, geographic proximity to the principal 
export market, ie the United States, which accounts for 54.6% of the exports and 38% 
of imports of CARIFORUM countries and makes the Caribbean different from other ACP 
EPA regions (South Centre 2008); moreover there are common ‘western hemisphere’ 
regional policy and organizational frameworks such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI) 7 , the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA)8, and the Inter-American Development Bank (cf the 
Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP, Caribbean 
Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS), and CARIFORUM). Hence, with the agreement of FAO ESTT, lessons from 
Central America – and examples from other regions - are woven into the discussion 
where it is helpful to do so.  
Terminology  
The language surrounding rural development, in general, and value chain development, 
in particular, is riddled with overlapping and vaguely-defined terminology. In the interest 
of a common understanding the issues discussed in this report, we use the following 
definitions: 
 
• Smallholders: Households who engage part time in agricultural production, often with 
relatively simple technologies and limited access to productive assets (usually less 
                                          
7 ‘The CBI is intended to facilitate the economic development and export diversification of the Caribbean Basin 
economies. Initially launched in 1983 through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), and 
substantially expanded in 2000 through the US-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), the CBI 
currently provides 19 beneficiary countries with duty-free access to the US market for most goods’. Currently 
nineteen countries benefit from the CBI program: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, 
Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago. 
(http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Development/Preference_Programs/CBI/Section_Index.html accessed 01-05-08). 
8  The Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) is a specialized agency of the Inter-
American System, and its purposes are to encourage and support the efforts of its Member States to achieve 
agricultural development and well-being for rural populations 
(http://www.iica.int/Eng/infoinstitucional/Pages/default.aspx accessed 01-05-08). 
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than 2 ha). Agricultural production is destined for market as well as for household 
needs (subsistence). In the context of value chain development programs, 
participating smallholders are usually among the better off, but still relatively poor, 
smallholders. 
• Non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs): This term is used to describe two 
general types of products: 1) products that have not been produced in a particular 
country before (eg organic coffee) and 2) products that were either traditionally 
produced for domestic consumption, but are now being exported (eg tropical fruits, 
fresh vegetables), or development of a new market for a traditional product (eg 
tropical fruits for local hotel industry).  
• Value chain: inter-firm coordination associated with the flow and successive 
transformation of goods from the raw materials stage, through to the end-user. In 
the development literature, emphasis is placed on the relations between large-scale 
buyers, processors and distributors (usually in the North), where products are 
consumed, with producers (usually in the South), where they are produced. It is 
conceptualized that Southern firms must find a place for themselves in value chains 
according to conditions imposed by upstream buyers and processors. The ability to 
capture increased value (upgrade) for Southern producers implies making capital 
investments and it is assumed that learning and investments can be achieved, or at 
least facilitated, though participation in the value chain.  
• Rural collective enterprise (RCEs): A commercial enterprise based on the production 
of agricultural products and services, collectively owned by smallholders for the 
marketing of their production and/or supply of inputs to members. Similar to but not 
necessarily synonymous with farmer organizations or rural producer organizations, 
the focus is on ‘enterprise’, the organization as a firm. Nevertheless, they often 
pursue multiple objectives, with profit maximization as only one of many goals. 
Typically, other goals are community development, improved local safety nets, 
influence over political processes, and member education. Most rural enterprises fall 
into the category of small and medium enterprises (SMEs)9. 
 
                                          
9 Official definitions of SMEs usually take into account the number of employees and the annual turnover. But 
these criteria vary widely across regions and countries. In the European Union, small and medium enterprises 
have between 11 and 50, and 51 and 250 employees, respectively. In the United States ranges are from 11 to 
100, and 101 and 500 employees for small and medium enterprises, respectively. In developing regions, 
formal definitions and common understandings vary but the economic and social contexts suggest lower 
ceilings for SMEs, for example a maximum of 100 employees and an annual turnover of less than US$3 million, 
according to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).  
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2 Issues in Caribbean agricultural development  
Non-traditional agriculture export as a development strategy 
Since the 1980s, governments in the Caribbean, as in other parts of the developing 
world, have based their agricultural development strategies on the promotion of NTAEs 
in hopes of 1) increasing foreign exchange and 2) finding alternatives to declining terms 
of trade associated with ‘traditional’ agricultural products (eg sugar, coffee, bananas). 
They may also perceive the NTAE sector as offering a possibility for the reduction of rural 
poverty, to the extent that it provides higher net prices for smallholders and generates 
rural employment. As part of the packages mandated by structural adjustment and trade 
liberalization programs, many governments in Caribbean introduced policies in favor of 
NTAE, such as export facilitation procedures, subsidy programs, and fiscal reforms. 
Trade agreements, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (US) and the Lomé Convention 
(EU) also created powerful incentives for NTAE promotion. In mainstream economics, 
NTAE strategies are typically justified on the principle of short-term comparative 
advantage, which, in the case of some Caribbean countries has related to a relatively 
rich natural-resource base and low-cost labor supply for harvesting and processing (eg 
Guyana, Belize, Jamaica). The basic argument is that, in the short run at least, by 
following the price signals of international markets and the cost signals of local 
technologies and resource availabilities, countries can specialize in products that they 
produce efficiently relative to the rest of the world. This specialization will maximize 
income from available resources and create an investible surplus for future growth. In 
the longer run, specialization and openness to the international market can allow for 
additional dynamic productivity improvement through technological innovation, 
economies of scale, and improved competition among firms.  
 
Much of the literature on NTAE focuses on 1) the design and application of policy 
instruments for NTAE promotion and 2) the potential of NTAE market access to improve 
economic performance and increase export revenues. In their review of export 
promotion strategies from the late 1980s, Barham et al. (1992:46) identify a common 
theme: ‘Their usual focus is to identify supply and demand conditions for nontraditional 
export products. A particular country’s land, labor, climate, infrastructure, and natural-
resource endowments are generally matched with evolving international demand 
patterns in an effort to target the best products for a national promotion effort led by the 
private sector. Recent data on price trends for the commodities and interviews with 
distributors in the importing countries about future demand prospects are compared with 
estimates of costs of production, rates of return on land and capital, some provisos 
about production-investments risk, and potential sources of financing to determine which 
commodities might be a good bet.’ Recently, Barghouti et al. (2004: 3) have argued that 
‘(export diversification) involves an unbiased economic analysis to identify the 
diversification opportunities at the community level. Information, extension, farming 
training and the attention of the private sector are then directed toward those 
opportunities…resources and training are provided to make appropriate selection of 
enterprises, especially to smallholder farmers cultivating in less favorable areas and 
landless poor people.’  
 
Among several Caribbean countries, considerable progress in export diversification has 
been achieved. For the period 1961-2000, Taylor (2003) characterizes export 
diversification performance among Caribbean countries based on quantitative measures 
derived from trade data: 
 
• Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad: Prior to 1980s, exhibited either declining levels of 
diversification or no clear trend. After 1980, all exhibited noticeable increases in 
diversification. In Barbados and Trinidad, the trend is attributed to decline in sugar 
exports, while in Jamaica diversification is related to increases in coffee and cigars.  
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• Belize and Guyana: Diversification measures exhibit generally declining values. In 
Belize, exports became concentrated in sugar, bananas, and juice. In Guyana, the 
decline is related to an increase in the proportion of sugar in total exports.  
• Dominican Republic (DR) and Haiti: Prior to 1980, neither demonstrated a clear trend 
in export diversification. However, since then, both have exhibited a significant 
increase in the diversity of exports. In the DR, this is related to a decline in sugar 
exports and an increase in fresh fruits and processed products. In Haiti, increased 
diversification is associated with exports of mangoes, coffee, and essential oils. 
• St. Lucia, Grenada, Dominican, St. Vincent, and St. Kitts: Demonstrated no clear 
tend in diversification. The exception is St. Kitts, where sugar production has fallen 
as land and labor have moved to more productive uses. 
 
Taylor’s analysis shows that a limited degree export diversification has taken place over 
the past 4 decades, however, overall trade volumes are low and sporadic, and that most 
Caribbean countries remain specialized in a limited number of exports. A few examples 
exist of Caribbean countries taking advantage of the emergence of niche markets, for 
example: organic cocoa in Belize and the Dominican Republic and fair trade bananas in 
the Westward Islands and Dominican Republic (see Box 2.1)  
 
 
Box 2.1 Diversification into fair trade banana market by Caribbean producers 
A decade ago the Caribbean supplied two-thirds of the bananas consumed in the UK, 
but lack of competitiveness has led to dramatic reductions in Caribbean exports. For 
example, throughout the Windward Islands (St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, 
Dominica) production fell from 123,000 in 2000 to 82,000 MT in 2004. The Caribbean 
banana industry has increasingly turned to fair trade and organic markets for 
generating increased returns. Two smallholder-owned enterprises in the Caribbean 
have been established for facilitating links with international traders: Windward 
Islands Farmers Association (WINFA) based in St. Lucia and Ecological Bananas from 
the Northwest Line Association (BANELINO) based in the Dominican Republic.  
 
• In 2002 and 2003, WINFA shipped 4,734 MT and 13,000 MT fair trade bananas, 
respectively. WINFA counted some 535 smallholders as members (approximately 
11% of the 5,000 bananas producers in the Windward Islands), who, in turn, 
employed some 500 permanent workers and 1,200 temporary workers. WINFA 
bananas are exported by WIBDECO for distribution. However, changes to fair 
trade certification systems are raising more barriers to entry into the EU market 
• BANELINO was formed in 2000 with extensive technical and financial assistance 
from government agencies and international donors. Between 2001 and 2005, 
exports increased from 9043 MT to 16,980 MT and membership levels rose from 
60 to 275. Since its formation, BANELINO has enjoyed a beneficial relationship 
with a local banana exporter (Plantaciones del Norte), which provides credit to 
BANELINO members for planting and purchase of production inputs. In addition, 
importers in the EU have facilitated loans for critical infrastructure development. 
Recent analysis has identified some challenges to the future development of 
BANELINO, including: 1) insufficient communication regarding fluctuations in price 
and rejection of fruit for quality control problems at various nodes in the value 
chain and 2) insufficient remuneration perceived by producers for bearing the 
high costs of EurepGap (now GlobalGap) certification (required by EU importers) 
(Donovan et al. 2008).  
 
However, concern is warranted regarding the sustainability of fair trade in bananas. 
Producers in some developing countries face problems of rationing, as potential 
supply is exceeding demand. There are also concerns about long-term effects on 
investments and productivity and the efficiency of fair trade channels. 
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Link between non-traditional agriculture and poverty reduction 
Most NTAE strategies are based on the notion that increased exports of hither-value 
projects result in reduced poverty, directly through increased incomes or employment or 
indirectly through spillover effects. However, there is no a priori reason to attribute NATE 
promotion to poverty reduction. Barham et al. (2002) make a strong case that 
assumptions regarding the competitive advantage of smallholders in NTAE export 
promotion may often have little validity in practice. First, rather than being a ‘given’, 
comparative advantage is a product of clearly defined land tenure, investment in service 
provision and technology, and institutional arrangements among smallholders and 
between smallholders and other actors in the value chain. Case studies of Paraguay, 
Chile and Guatemala by Carter et al. (1996) illustrate the range of possible impacts of 
NTAE promotion. Paraguay’s wheat boom directly favored large-scale farmers who 
absorb relatively little labor per hectare, and created a highly exclusionary pattern of 
growth that left peasants out as both producers and workers10. In highland Guatemala 
the adoption of vegetable exports favored smallholders, at least up to a point, but 
pesticide residues began to threaten entry into the US markets. Access to good roads 
and infrastructure played an important role in stimulating adoption in Chile’s fruit export 
boom which bypassed the smallholders as economies of scale in production and 
packaging were an impediment to small quantities of products. Export credit was made 
available, but most smallholders were not able to obtain loans. In each of these cases, 
land concentration appears to have increased. Evidence suggests that food safety 
assurance in the design and implementation of NTAE strategies has been given 
insufficient attention by donors, governments and the private sector alike (Box 2.1).  
 
Drawing on experiences in Central America in the 1980s, William (1998) highlights the 
importance of land tenure for the effective implementation of NTAE strategies. 
Historically, the main negative impact of NTAE promotion on smallholders has been their 
displacement from the land they previously operated and the conflict associated 
therewith: when land and labor become more valuable, the rich focus harder on 
asserting control over these resources’ The beef boom of Central America during the 
period 1960-1980 displaced thousands of smallholders from land that they had 
previously farmed either without official title or with only usufruct rights. This 
displacement created unemployment due to the low labor requirements of cattle 
ranching. When the benefits to be obtained from exports are modest, they may not 
induce serious conflict over the resources which produce them. On a more positive note, 
physical displacement may also be less likely when resource ownerships and usage are 
more clearly defined (including official recognition of customary rights), governments 
prioritize smallholder development, and smallholders are effectively organized into social 
and business organizations (see Carrera et al. (2004) for discussion of the role of social 
organization in land access by smallholders in Petén, Guatemala).  
 
The connection between NTAE expansion and poverty reduction and increased livelihood 
security hinges fundamentally on 1) the ability of exports to provide a source of effective 
demand for mobilizing idle resources; 2) relatively inelastic international demand; and 3) 
producers having the resources and capacities to effectively respond to the more 
demanding requirements of NTAE markets. When these assumptions do not hold, NTAE 
expansion and its related impacts of economic development, in general, and poverty 
reduction, in particular, may be limited. The following lessons have emerged from 
experiences since the 1980s: 
 
• The ‘adding up effect’: There is a general assumption that export revenues for NTAEs 
are not adversely affected by increased supply, based on the ‘small country’ 
                                          
10 This situation is being repeated with the current soya boom: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39972 
accessed 01-05-08. 
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assumption that any given country will produce only a small share of the product. 
Although this assumption is reasonable for one country, it overlooks the potential for 
regional overproduction of NTAEs – also known as the ‘adding up effect’ (for a 
detailed discussion of adding up for NTAE from developing countries see Hallam et al. 
2004). Moreover, to the extent that NTAE strategies require large sunk investments 
(eg construction of large-scale processing plants, establishment of tree crop 
plantations, and conversion to organic production systems), supply adjustments will 
be limited even if prices fall.  
• Price volatility in thin markets for NTAEs: NTAE strategies are based on the notion 
that by expanding the number of different types of exports, there will be a reduction 
in exposure to the boom and bust cycles of commodity markets. However, reduction 
in export earning fluctuations will not be achieved if prices of the products in the new 
export portfolio move in the same direction as those of the old portfolio (covariance 
in price). Interestingly, the portfolio of NTAEs adopted by some Central American 
countries may fluctuate more due to the increased price volatility than they did 
before diversification took place (Conroy 1990).  
• Limited resources and capacities at the household level: Links between the decision 
to adopt particular NTAE strategies and the existence of institutions and services that 
help mitigate the associated risks or cover resource gaps have not been given the 
attention that research on such adoption in other contexts suggests is essential. 
Especially for smallholders, the risks associated with NTAEs can be substantively 
reduced by crop insurance, technical assistance on pest control, improved access to 
credit and services for enterprise business organizational strengthening and 
diversification of market contacts. Land tenure remains an issue in throughout the 
Caribbean and Central America (see Box 2.2 for discussion on current land tenure 
struggles among the Maya of Southern Belize). Barham and colleagues note that 
without attention to the need for such programs, higher returns and incomes may be 
forgone by smallholders, or worse yet, lost permanently because of one bad crop.  
• Growing conditions in the tropics for annuals: In the rainy season when climate 
conditions are more favorable, smallholder plantations are affected by pest 
infestations. Proper application of pesticides during the season and, therefore, 
availability of the required financial liquidity and access to technical assistance are 
preconditions for successfully cultivating NTAEs. The dry season is characterized by 
relatively low pest problems but low water availability. Irrigation, thus, often 
becomes a prerequisite for successfully growing NTAEs. Failure effectively to address 
these issues can reduce the comparative advantage that smallholders may have in 
growing labor-intensive NTAEs (Carletto et al. 1999)  
• Limitations of smallholder business organizations: The formation of smallholder 
business organizations can help to reduce transaction costs and the inefficiencies 
associated with imperfect information. They often provide members with access to 
credit, links with buyers and processors (improved trust relations), and insurance 
through limited liability on loans. However, rural enterprises tend to be ill-equipped 
to carry out their functions over the long term, often characterized by discontinuity in 
management, low prices, and high default rates on pending debts (consequence of 
poor credit decisions and low prices). 
• Latterly climate change and instability11 through global warming, and the current 
dramatic price rises 12  in basic commodities and derived agricultural inputs and 
foodstuffs are changing the short, medium and long-term conditions of and prospects 
for global agriculture (von Braun 2007, FAO 2008a). In the Americas, short and 
medium term prospects for the production of major food crops are not unfavorable 
for Central America and the Caribbean, while the scenario for the principal South 
American producers is mixed (FAO 2008b), and much affected by policy intervention 
(Financial Times 2008). 
 
                                          
11 http://www.occ.gov.uk/activities/stern.htm; http://www.ipcc.ch/ accessed 01-05-08 
12 http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/fpr/pr18.asp; http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation accessed 01-05-08 
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For some smallholders, failure to address these issues may result in a shift back to the 
production of traditional crops for the domestic market, which had been partially 
abandoned in the early stages of NTAE adoption.  
Constraints for promoting non-traditional agriculture  
Despite national-level incentives to diversify agriculture, and multitudes of development 
projects with some type of diversification component, the overall trend in exports from 
Caribbean ACP countries is one of dependence on traditional commodities for the bulk of 
agricultural export earnings (McElroy & Albuquerque 1990). In a recent study, Skoet et 
al. (2004) identify Caribbean ACP countries that rely on one commodity for more than 
20% of their export earnings: Guyana (20% sugar), Belize (21% orange juice), Grenada 
(21% nutmeg, mace, cardamom), Dominica (22% bananas), Dominican Republic (26% 
cigar cheroots), St Vincent (39% bananas), St Lucia (66% bananas). The few 
commodities that are exported go to a limited number of markets (Ford & Rawlins 2007): 
the E.U. and the US markets alone account for more than two-thirds of Caribbean 
agricultural exports, with only 12.7% of exports going to ‘other’ destinations.  
Box 2.2 Land tenure among the Maya peoples in southern Belize 
Land tenure issues remain a constraint to long-term agricultural development 
throughout the Caribbean. As the experiences in Belize show, these issues can be 
especially complex when they involve indigenous peoples. In Belize, there are two 
types of tenure arrangements among Maya communities: the reservation system and 
the lease system. The reservation system allows Maya communities to hold land 
collectively and provides community members with flexibility in its use under 
traditional management systems. This arrangement is preferred by some Mayans, 
since slash and burn agriculture requires shifting cultivation, the reservation provides 
limited restrictions on movement. Approximately 70,000 acres are unofficially 
classified as reservation. However, reservations have never been physically 
demarcated nor legally defined as the communal property. At least 20 Maya villages 
are located outside reservation boundaries where smallholders operate under the 
lease system. The leaseholder has the use of the land as long as he continues to use 
the land and pay rent to the Government. For some Maya, leases can be appealing as 
they allow for increased access credit and grant the right to retain land claims during 
village absences (Emch 2003).  
There is division within Maya communities about how to resolve the land tenure 
issue. Some communities have parcelled out their holdings among members, thereby 
facilitating lease agreements. In contrast, others want their community boundary 
demarcated, with land inside the boundary held under their collective ownership. 
Nonetheless, all communities want their boundaries demarcated whether they prefer 
lease or communal ownership or a combination of the two. In addition, the 
construction of a new highway that connects with the Guatemalan border is a concern 
to the security of the land under Maya occupation. This highway will cut through the 
centre of the Maya territory, and has the potential to increase land values and 
accelerate logging activities where few people have legal recognition of their 
landholdings. During the 1990s, the government granted concessions to logging 
companies in or close to the reservations, increasing the tension between GoB and 
the Maya communities of the land tenure issue. 
As part of its long-term vision for the development of the agricultural sector, MAF has 
identified the need to ‘resolve land tenure issues that inhibit more optimum and 
sustainable uses of land for production activities’ (MAF 2003). However, little 
advancement has been detected in resolving this issue. Effectively addressing the 
Toledo land tenure issues will require extensive consultation and careful preparation, 
as well as financial commitments, by both the GoB and the Maya communities. 
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Several authors have noted the overall decline in Caribbean agriculture, in general, and 
the limitations faced for diversifying into NTAEs, in particular. Drawing on lessons from 
the English-speaking Caribbean, Heath (1988) argued that Caribbean governments have 
been ill-prepared to promote NTAEs given that 1) production is highly fragmented 
among smallholders, due in part, to problems associated with the passing of former 
plantation lands from private into public ownership and their parceling out among 
smallholders as leasehold or freehold properties, 2) there are limited capacities of 
smallholders and small enterprises to compete inter- and intra-regionally on the basis of 
price and quality (see box 2.3 for discussion on food safety challenges in Jamaica), and 3) 
there is reduced the scope of intervention in the agricultural sector, giving priority to 
industrial and tourism development. In light of these limitations, Heath recommended 
that development strategies include the promotion of staple production for the domestic 
market and increasing food security. Recognizing the potential for market saturation and 
limited economic incentives for production of staples, Heath suggests the need for 
investments in market intelligence services, thus allowing smallholders to identify and 
respond to local and intra-regional market opportunities: ‘By increasing the consistency 
of produce quality and reducing supply irregularities, smallholders will be better placed 
to tap the large tourist demand that exists on many islands.’ While increased focus on 
staples can contribute to increased livelihood security (mainly through lower risk), 
effectively dealing with the issue will most likely require efforts well beyond those of 
market intelligence. First, recent evidence suggests that most market intelligence 
systems installed by governments in Latin America have been unable to provide timely 
information in a format that is usable by smallholders. Second, these recommendations 
largely ignore the central limitations to smallholder development, including limited 
access to productive resources, lack of infrastructure, inputs, and technology, and 
ineffective arrangements for overcoming scale inefficiencies (eg collective organizations). 
A recent report has highlighted the continuation of separate development paths of 
agriculture and the tourism industry in Caribbean countries (ECLAC 2005): export-
oriented agriculture has been disconnected from local food demands.  
 
 
 
Box 2.3 Food safety challenges in Jamaica’s NTAE sector 
Henson & Jaffee (2005) examine the food safety challenges faced by Jamaica in the 
development of NTAEs. Jamaican trade in a wide range of NTAEs accelerated in the 
first half of the 1990s, including: fresh fruits and vegetables (eg yam, sweet potato, 
hot peppers, mango, papaya), herbs and spices, fish and fishery products (eg lobster, 
tilapia), and processed food products (eg pepper sauces, chutneys, soups, juices). 
However, for any of these NTAEs, Jamaican supplies are currently encountering 
significant market access challenges associated with pesticide residues, plant pests, 
food hygiene, additives and contamination. Henson & Jaffee argue that Jamaica’s 
system of food safety and plant health management has not evolved sufficiently in 
response to changes in international standards, the requirements of Jamaica’s major 
trading partners, and shifts in composition of its agricultural and food exports. While 
the basic elements of capacity are in place and existing public institutions operate 
relatively well, they are directed at outdated principles and procedures. The current 
level of resources is inadequate to meet the needs of the export sector. In general, 
Jamaica’s NTAEs face a broad range of competitiveness constraints related to 
inconsistent raw material production, high post-harvest losses, relatively high cost 
and limited availability of labor, and intensified regional and other competition. 
Market access problems related to SPS matters have exacerbated and reinforced 
these constraints, reducing the profitability and raising the risks associated with these 
trades. The resolution of such SPS constraints is necessary, although not sufficient, to 
restore and improve the competitiveness of Jamaica’s NTAEs.  
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In Guyana, NTAE expansion has been limited, in part, by an unfavorable political-legal 
framework for agricultural development. Canterbury (2007) compares the performance 
of the agricultural sector in Guyana under two contrasting development approaches: 
state-driven (1964-1992) and market-driven (1992-present). He argues that policy aims 
under both approaches sought to address essentially the same set of problems: 
expansion of NTAE to reverse mono-crop production (sugar), increased output of 
secondary crops for domestic consumption, and improved infrastructure. However, the 
related approaches were dramatically different. Under the state-led approach, the overall 
aim was to ‘secure food supply’ (i.e., import substitution). In addition to restricting the 
importation of a wide range of foods, policies focused on: 1) nationalization of sugar 
industry, 2) formation of cooperatives and marketing boards for increased efficient in 
input and output markets (eg Guyana Rice Milling and Marketing Authority), 3) provision 
of credit through development banks, and 4) research for alternative methods of food 
processing and preservation. Overall, the programs were not effective, resulting in 
severe shortages of food in the 1970s and 1980s. Sugar production levels were halved, 
from 324,000 tons in 1978 to 168,000 tons in 1988, due, in part, to lack of management 
experience, labor unrest, and insufficient investment (Merrill 1992). No radical land 
reform was carried out, despite claims of the necessity for such change.  
 
McElroy & Albuquerque (1990) examined the general decline in agriculture among 
several small-island states (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and St. 
Vincent) during the 1980s. They argue that with the economic restructuring from rural 
development to tourism and export manufacturing, together with increased urbanization 
and immigration, land and labor resources have been unnecessarily drawn away from 
the agricultural sector. That is, tourism and urban development have come at the 
expense of rural development 13 . In addition to institutional constraints common 
throughout Caribbean ACP countries (eg inadequate infrastructure, limited access to 
credit, policy environment favoring large scale production), small island states have 
additional challenges. First, agro-climatic conditions are critical, including steep 
topography, thin soil, inadequate rainfall, and susceptibility to periodic flooding. Second, 
smallholders are more likely to suffer from scale issues: uneconomic scale of production, 
intense competition from imports, imported pesticides and fertilizers. Finally, wage and 
land-price differentials between agricultural and tourist/industrial sectors reduce 
incentives for pull resources out of agriculture. However, as highlighted in Box 2.4, 
smallness can also have some important benefits, for example: reduced risk from 
disease and pests. McElroy and Albuquerque call for a re-conceptualization of the 
agricultural development approaches, whereby the agriculture sector is recognized as a 
source of ‘outputs, linkages and livelihoods,’ rather than land and labor inputs to the 
urban and tourism economies. Specifically, they recommend: increasing attention to the 
environmental costs of large scale tourism projects, building awareness regarding the 
role of agriculture in sustainable resource management, shifting of policy from large-
scale commercial exports toward greater emphasis on smallholder agriculture, and 
integrating agricultural policy into long-term tourist development strategies. While some 
progress has been made in this direction due to efforts by international donors and the 
private sector in the Dominican Republic (organic cocoa, coffee, bananas), the Windward 
Islands (organic bananas), and Belize (organic cocoa), considerable work remains to be 
done.  
 
In addition to the impacts of the industry and tourism industries on agriculture in small 
island states (SIS), the overall political and market environment has discouraged 
                                          
13 Not all researchers agree on the tradeoffs between agricultural and tourism development – for review see 
Telfer & Wall (1996). For example, Latimer (1981) argues that, while tourism has caused an increase in wages 
and has drawn labour from other sectors including agriculture, the fact that younger generation do not want to 
work in agriculture cannot be blamed on tourism. Along a similar vain, Weaver (1988) suggests the decline of 
agricultural in the Caribbean can be ‘attributed largely to the emergence of tourism as a viable alternative to a 
chronically unstable agricultural sector, prompting the lateral transfer of investment capital by local and 
expatriate plantation interests from agriculture to tourism.’  
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agricultural production, especially as related to production for local markets, giving rise 
to the high levels of food import penetration observed in the region (ECLAC 2005). 
Drawing on evidence from St. Vincent, Grossman (1993) challenges the often-held 
perception that the decline of local food production is a direct result of increased 
production for export markets. During the 1990s, export banana production in St. 
Vincent was expanding while food production in banana-growing areas was declining. 
However, he argues that export agriculture was not the primary cause of the decline in 
local food production. In fact, certain environmental features associated with banana 
production actually facilitate agricultural production for local markets, mainly fruits and 
vegetables. Nor was limited interest in production for local markets resulting from the 
pressures of export agriculture. Agricultural production for local markets was declining in 
banana-growing areas in St. Vincent primarily because of unfavorable political-economic 
contexts of producing and marketing local food crops as compared to bananas for export. 
Among the problems that limit production for local markets are: marked volatility in 
prices, consumer preferences for higher quality foods, and lower costs of imported 
products. In addition, intervention by the state and foreign capital in smallholder 
production has made banana production more attractive than production for local 
markets by facilitating access to credit to obtain agrochemical inputs and establishing 
fixed prices for banana exports. In addition, bananas are less prone to crop theft and 
face better access to scarce labor supplies. According to Grossman, in general, shortages 
of agricultural wage labor in SIS inhibit fruit and vegetable production more than banana 
production, as working in banana-related activities is considered less arduous and 
provides more status than work in fruit and vegetable production.  
 
 
 
As highlighted by Kendall et al. (2003), not all agree on the role of agricultural 
development in the overall development process of small island states (SIS) in the 
Caribbean. Based on the failures of previous strategies to promote import substitution, 
Kendall and colleagues call for increased attention to ‘competitive advantage’ in policy 
making in the Caribbean SIS. For some countries in the region, they argue, agricultural 
development may not be a desirable option, given low resource endowments and 
Box 2.4 The benefits and limitations of being a small-island state (SIS) 
The main advantages of a SIS economy can be encapsulated as follows: 
• Limited scope for economies of scale: One of two patterns may emerge: The 
economy becomes very specialized relative to larger countries or the average size 
of enterprise remains small. In the former case, the economy is highly vulnerable 
to demand swings; in the latter, costs remain high relative to larger economies.  
• Small domestic market: May result in difficulties to attract outside investment, or 
keep local investment at home (high fixed costs relative to the scale of the 
investment). In addition, transport costs may be raised by the inability to buy in 
bulk. However, bulk goods when they do arrive can flood the domestic market.  
• Small impact on other economies: Exporters from SIS are more likely to able to 
exploit a niche market without raising the fears of the domestic producers or 
alerting larger competitors. However, smallness raises problems of achieving the 
volume needed to engage in advertising, and the difficulties of maintaining 
regular supplies. 
• Vulnerable to external events: Being small magnifies the impact of an external 
economic event or weather-related disaster. World market price changes for the 
small range of goods produced by SIS can have a devastating impact.  
• Natural barriers against disease: Small islands are still relatively disease-free than 
large landmasses. This is increasingly important in a time of stringent sanitary 
and phytosanitary barriers and the availability of higher prices for organic crops. 
Source: Josling (1998) 
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comparative advantage in non-agricultural exports (mainly tourism and financial 
services). These include: Barbados, Bahamas, and St. Lucia, Trinidad, with St. Kitts, 
Grenada, Antigua and St. Vincent tending in this direction. Moreover, these countries are 
already highly dependent on food imports. They suggest that rather than invest in the 
development of agriculture per se, countries should develop food reserves at the national 
and regional levels, whereby countries in the region with a relatively strong agricultural 
sector are used as depositories of food stocks for the region as a whole. While there is 
general agreement in the literature regarding the limitations of import substitution 
policies, it is difficult to support these recommendations. First, they largely ignore the 
issue of equity within Caribbean countries (i.e., poverty concentrated in the rural sector). 
Second, they assume a priori that trade offs exist between agricultural development and 
urban and tourism development; however, as the discussion below highlights, synergies 
can be derived through linkages with between agriculture and tourism. A policy of 
creating food reserves is unlikely also to benefit the local agricultural economy. 
Value chain approaches for promoting non-traditional exports  
The promotion of non-traditional exports as a development strategy falls short for two 
main reasons. First, it largely ignores the key role played by the social context in which 
producers, buyers and processors operate that determines under what conditions 
smallholders access non-traditional markets and can increase the value added to their 
primary production. Throughout much of the writings on NTAEs in the 1980s and early 
1990s, the issue of market access was mainly a technical one: responding to a given 
opportunity in a final market required a package of inputs, including finance, know-how, 
and production inputs. Second, NTAE strategies do not address the issues related to 
rural livelihoods and poverty, despite that fact that most NTAE strategies required 
significant investments of household resources and implied increased levels of risk in 
production and marketing. These limitations provided the basis for many of the critiques 
of NTAE strategies. In light of these limitations, in the mid-1990s, discussions among 
researchers and development practitioners began to shift from a focus on NTAE 
promotion to value chain analysis and (‘pro-poor’) value chain development. In this 
section, we briefly review the main conceptual elements of the value chain framework, 
and examine how the framework has been applied to the design of development 
interventions.  
The value chain framework  
The emergence value chain analysis (VCA) as a coherent analytical framework can be 
traced to the volume ‘Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism’ edited by Gereffi et al. in 
1994 (Bair 2005). Gereffi and collaborators were concerned with the links at the North-
South nexus of international trade, and the resulting opportunities for Southern 
producers to move into higher value adding activities. VCA treats the global economy as 
system of chains within which successive transformations and final marketing of 
products take place. These chains connect distant buyers and processors (usually in the 
North) with producers (usually in the South). To export, producers must position 
themselves in the chain according to conditions imposed by buyers and processors. The 
ability to capture increased value for Southern producers implies upgrading skills, 
products, and processes, and making capital investments accordingly. It is assumed that 
learning and investments can be achieved, or at least facilitated, through intensified 
connections within value chains and definition of related ‘rules of the game’. The notion 
that firms are connected through chains or networks is not new; since the 1980s, 
discussions of supply chains have been a major focus of international business. Thus, the 
conceptual innovation in VCA relates to ‘governance’ (i.e., ability to impose conditions on 
Southern firms) and its impact on the upgrading prospects of Southern producers.  
 
Governance in the value chain literature refers to perceived power of Northern ‘lead’ 
firms to determine the division of labor and related benefits along the chain (Humphrey 
& Schmitz 2005). Lead firms acquire their status due to their cultural and geographic 
 19 
proximity to final consumers and access to capital, information, and technology, rather 
than from production itself. The governance structures are considered to have important 
consequences for the access of Southern producers to Northern markets and the range 
of value adding activities they can undertake. Gereffi (1999) argues that participation in 
value chains provides Southern producers with lower-cost access to growing markets, as 
well as access to information and technical assistance that allow producers to upgrade 
and capture increased value adding. In this context, participation in value chains is 
considered a prerequisite for Southern producers to upgrade, and one that involves 
acceptance of the terms defined by lead firms, especially for those aiming to progress 
towards higher value added positions in the chain. Without accepting chain discipline, a 
firm cannot partake in the process of learning from links with agents in more advanced 
downstream segments of the chain, as precondition for moving into higher-skill and 
higher valued-added sections of the chain.  
 
From a development perspective, the notion of ‘upgrading’ by Southern producers in a 
value chain is especially important. This refers to producers’ options for capturing 
greater value-added, through, for example, increased processing, more equitable 
risk/benefit sharing, improved quality and productivity, and joint marketing. Northern 
buyers and processors can play an important role in the upgrading process, by 
facilitating information and resources and sharing strategies and technical know-how. 
But, as highlighted above, upgrading may also occur without explicit coordination with 
lead firms. The willingness and ability of Southern producers to invest in upgrading will 
depend on such factors as: degree of business consolidation, resource endowments at 
household, enterprise and community levels, access to information and technology, 
overall business environment, and role of NGOs and other service providers in reducing 
risk and costs, as well as covering resource gaps. Where chains are characterized by 
highly competitive market environments, such as those for undifferentiated agricultural 
products, upgrading may be limited to increased scale and efficiency (Gibbon and Ponte 
2004). In these cases, smallholders are unlikely to perceive sufficient economic 
incentives for investing in enhanced quality (eg Lusby and Derks 2006), nor are buyers 
likely to have the willingness to support such investments in cases where quality is easily 
differentiated by the market (Panlibuton & Lusby 2006). On the other hand, more 
promising upgrading opportunities may exist where: 1) year round supply of raw 
material is relatively scarce (eg farm raised salmon), 2) quality and safety are especially 
important and difficult to detect (eg organic products, fresh fruit and vegetables), and 3) 
competition in Northern markets encourages outsourcing of activities (eg fresh fruit and 
vegetables).  
Value chain approaches for development  
In the late 1990s, the value chain conceptual framework was adopted for the design of 
development approaches. This was in response to structural changes in international 
food and forest product markets and the need for greater impact and sustainability of 
development interventions through increased private-sector involvement (based on the 
limitations of previous efforts in promoting NTAEs). Value chain approaches pursued by 
public sector agencies or civil society organizations have tended to focus on poverty 
reduction and, hence, target smallholders and rural communities as main beneficiaries. 
Related interventions involve development projects, government agencies, and NGOs 
who typically provide subsidized technical assistance and training and, to varying 
degrees, inputs and credit to a select group of smallholders. The overall aim is to 
upgrade their resources and capacities for their positioning in value chains of higher-
value products. In some cases, interventions have focused on improving the overall 
competitiveness of a given sector, through improved services, infrastructure investments, 
financial incentives, and increased information sharing. In addition, the private sector, in 
particular lead firms that buy or process agricultural or forest products, have 
implemented value chain approaches to enhance sourcing of raw materials or inputs and 
to promote their environmental and social credentials.  
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Current examples of value chain approaches in the Caribbean include:  
 
• The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has recently financed a project aimed 
at better understanding the challenges for small and medium firms to market 
integration: This project, titled: ‘CARICOM: Value Chains, Regional Integration and 
Competitiveness in the CSME’ (2007-2008), has two major lines of action: 1) provide 
recommendations for improving competitiveness in a more integrated regional 
(CARICOM) market for companies operating in the Caribbean food production and 
distribution, housing construction and sports and cultural tourism value chains and 2) 
facilitate networking opportunities for these companies and their interaction with 
relevant policy makers in the region (For more information see: 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=916237).  
• DFID’s Sustainable Value Chains approach for promoting income generating 
opportunities for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) has been implemented in 
the agriculture, forest and tourism sectors of various countries in the Caribbean and 
Central America. The major elements of the approach are the provision by a lead firm 
(eg international buyers or hotels) of technology, finance, business skills, quality 
control and enhancement mechanisms, and support to exercise responsibilities for 
social and environmental management. DFID is linked with the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) who own the ‘Business Edge’ concept for training managers which 
is delivered through franchisee partners and certified organizations to help managers 
in SMEs to overcome functional and operational deficiencies (DFID 2007).  
• In addition, USAID has promoted value chain approaches in the Dominican Republic 
for promotion smallholder integration into coffee and cocoa chains and in Haiti for the 
regional tourism market and international home furnishing markets (see Box 2.5). 
The private sector, in particular medium and large-scale buyers and processors, have 
also implemented value chain approaches in an effort to enhance sourcing of raw 
materials and inputs, and to promote their environmental and social credentials 
• Various US and European-based buyers have also invested in the development of 
value chain linkages. Box 2.6 provides an example of private-sector led value chain 
development in Jamaica in the fresh herb sector. In Belize, The UK-based chocolate 
marketer ‘Green and Black’s’ has invested over several years in the promotion of 
smallholder cocoa production and the organization and development of the 
smallholder cocoa enterprise ‘TCGA’ (for details, see Case Study 1, Section 3).  
 
Underlying these approaches is the assumption that investments in building stronger 
linkages with buyers and processors in higher-value markets will reduce poverty, directly 
through increased incomes or employment or indirectly through spillover effects in local 
economies. However, little quantitative evidence exists to support these claims. In their 
review of USAID’s experiences in MSE upgrading in nine value chains, Dunn and 
colleagues (2006) offer little insight into the impacts on income levels, asset 
accumulation, and livelihood strategies, other than to suggest that these issues may be 
important for ‘successful upgrading’. In their review of value chain analysis carried out 
by development practitioners in Central America, Jansen & Torero (2004) highlight the 
need for increased conceptual and methodological clarity: ‘the organizations that carry 
out value chain research do so according to their own perspective, generally in an 
incomplete manner, and with little reference to other studies. …The chain bottleneck 
most frequently identified is technology. However, little detail is given on the technical 
aspects that generate the bottleneck. …There is no emphasis on small producers or how 
they can improve their value chains linked to more dynamic markets.’ In the 
international conference ‘Value Chains for Broad-based Development’ held in Berlin in 
May 2007, one of the major outcomes was that few of those promoting value chains, if 
any, have evidence on their impact on poverty reduction. 
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Box 2.5 Value chain approach for promoting the handicrafts sector in Haiti  
The handicrafts sector in Haiti comprises an estimated 400,000 producers. Evidence 
suggests that up to 80% of exports are destined for the US The Caribbean islands are 
also an important market due to their geographic and cultural proximity and the large 
number of tourists which visit the region. However, one disadvantage of this market 
is the lack of distributors, which requires exporters to manage numerous buyer 
relations each one buying relatively small quantities. In 2006, USAID consultants, 
together with local producers and marketers, analyzed the constraints and 
opportunities for development of the handicrafts sector. Their analysis identified the 
following four constraints: 
 
• Limited capacity to identify and establish relations with buyers: The political and 
economic instability of Haiti has kept some larger producers from seeking new 
business opportunities or investing in marketing. For small producers, the issue is 
mainly irregular and low production volumes.  
• Lack of regular access to affordable supplies of raw materials: Small scale 
increases the resources spent on sourcing affordable materials. Producers are 
unlikely to import their own materials due to perceived risks (stolen cargo or 
detainment by authorities) and inability to coordinate among producers, who 
rarely receive orders requiring the same materials at the same 
• Restricted access to finance: Financial constraints limit the ability to increase 
production capacity or improve productivity to satisfy large orders. As a result, 
craft factories are unable to consider orders for large unit quantities. 
• Insecure political environment: Uncertainty and insecurity result in unwillingness 
to make major investments; reduction of tourists and visitors to the islands; and 
reluctance of buyers to visit Haiti or conduct business with local products.  
 
While the objective of stimulating development of the Haitian handicraft sector, local 
market actors have identified the following goals: 1) increase communication among 
market actors through workshops, association, and networks, and 2) identify existing 
and potential agents to fill a market intermediation role between producers and 
buyers that would be a source of information on market trends and links to potential 
buyers. Following the workshop, the USAID assessment team proposed several 
following steps, one of which included technical assistance for ‘new product 
development and design’ and dealing with the issues of finance and access to 
productive inputs.  
Source: Derks et al. (2006) 
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Based on recent experiences in value chain development in Central America and the 
Caribbean, Junkin et al. (2003) provide a framework for the identification of ‘pro-poor’ 
value chain development opportunities that explicitly takes into account the resources 
and capacities available for investment by smallholder producers, as well as the potential 
tradeoffs between increased investment in value chains and current productive activities. 
Among the issues to be addressed in identifying pro-poor value chain development 
opportunities and establishing effective monitoring and evaluations systems are: 
 
• Minimum capital endowments and asset building, including technical, business and 
financial capacities (see Table 2.2) 
• The role of gender in setting up, developing and managing rural enterprises, 
including potential trade-offs between livelihood activities and goals when only males 
or females participate 
Box 2.6 Private-sector led value chain development: Sourcing fresh herbs 
from Jamaica 
In the late 1980s two entrepreneurs recognized an opportunity for the development 
of a fresh-cut herb business operating out of the Caribbean to service the US market, 
resulting in the creation of Herbonics, Inc. Domestic culinary use of fresh herbs was 
novel and also consistent with a healthy and nutritious diet. While the range and 
quality of fresh produce was considered by retailers to be a major choice factor in 
supermarket shopping, the fresh cut herb sector was badly served through weak 
supplies and poor in-store merchandising. Quality and presentation were poor, 
packaging was messy, pricing was confusing, and regular quality supplies from 
reliable growers were problematic.  
 
Herbonics Inc sourced produce from its own production facilities in Florida and set up 
supply agreements with producers in Jamaica, Mexico and Ecuador. Compared with 
competitors, Jamaica had logistical advantages, specifically those of geographical 
proximity to Florida, the target market, good air links, and production facilities close 
to the airport in Kingston. Moreover, there was a question of language and culture: 
English was a distinct advantage over Spanish-speaking suppliers. A product listing of 
more than twenty herbs and blends was envisaged. A single pricing structure was 
adopted with a retail price per pack of $1.19, and a gross margin between producer 
and supermarket of 40%, and a retailer mark-up of 68%. Sales grew from less than 
$100,000 in 1990 to over $5 million by the end of the decade. Initially there were six 
Jamaican producers supplying Herbonics Inc. While each farm was only 1-2 ha in 
size, production was labor-intensive (25 full-time workers/ha). Details of revenues 
and wages are not available, but gross returns to the suppliers was in the region of 
‘several hundred thousand US$’, with multiplier effects throughout the local 
economy. However, over time the number of suppliers in Jamaica was reduced in 
favor of production in Florida, because of the greater ease of doing business locally 
and cost structures that were not markedly different. Those Jamaican suppliers 
remaining gained a larger level of business.  
 
Principal lessons highlighted in this example of agricultural development included: a 
business approach to small agro-enterprise development that is driven by market 
opportunities, and the erosion of the basis for competitive advantage. A plausible 
sectoral strategy is intervention involving provision of small business services 
including information, management and marketing, development of human skills, and 
financial investment (eg business loans, or even micro equity). Small enterprise 
development such as Herbonics Inc in Jamaica has wider potential through outscaling 
by the replication and clustering of similar units which can create economies of scale 
in business services provision and agglomeration economies in the markets for 
management, labor, inputs and logistics. 
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• Internal relationships among members and first-tier producer groups, including rules, 
practices and customs governing benefit sharing, decision making, and information 
sharing  
• Existing formal and informal relations with value chain partners (horizontal and 
vertical alliances and other commercial arrangements) and related opportunities and 
limitations for increased value adding by rural enterprises  
• Costs and benefits of value chain participation, including non-economic benefits 
related to skills upgrading, strengthened cultural identify, and social infrastructure  
• Access to externally-sourced technical, financial and business development services 
for household production and enterprise development  
• Access to useful market information by smallholders and collective organizations and 
their ability to process the information for short and long-term strategy formulation. 
 
Table 2.1 Analysis of household and community resources for value chain 
development  
Household 
and 
community 
resources  
Aspects to be considered 
Natural Land tenure systems, soils, water, annual and perennial crops, forest 
resources, livestock, genetic material 
Human Skills for production, processing and business administration, 
understanding of business and market conditions, health and nutrition 
Social  Level of internal and external organization (networks, contacts, 
relations of confidence and reciprocity), leadership, participatory 
mechanisms, access to political decision markers  
Physical  Road, electricity, and telecommunications networks, access to health 
and education services, transport, production facilities, irrigation 
systems, tools, equipment, and other inputs for production and 
processing  
Financial Remittances, non-farm income, access to credit (formal and informal), 
savings (cash and other liquid accounts) 
 
In summary, the value chain framework is important for rural development because it 
orientates production, intervention and innovation towards the demands of downstream 
buyers and processors. However, little evidence exists that value chain promotion has 
the desired impact on pro-poor development. In addition to impact studies, a number of 
other critical issues have yet to be addressed. To understand the poverty reduction 
impacts, it is necessary to identify the equity effects of intervention strategies within the 
household by age and gender, as well as between households and communities. 
Development pathways are likely to vary among different social strata (Poole, Gauthier 
and Mizrahi 2007). Little is known about minimum levels of asset endowment required 
for value chain development at the household and community levels. While research has 
addressed asset endowments at the enterprise level, rural households and communities 
remain a ‘black box’ in value chain analysis. Recently, several organizations working in 
rural business development in the Central America and the Caribbean have joined forces 
to 1) generate new knowledge about value chain development and its impacts on the 
rural poor and 2) improve the capacities of organizations that provide services directly to 
smallholders and design rural development interventions. Some important on-going 
examples are: 
 
• Strengthening the regional offer of business development services: The Diploma in 
Rural Enterprise Development in Latin America strengthens the capacities of business 
service providers to facilitate the organization and development of smallholder-owned 
enterprises. The Diploma, awarded jointly by CATIE and CIAT, addresses critical 
areas such as business development from a livelihoods perspective and value chain 
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approaches for linking with in international markets. To date, more than 150 
professionals have participated in the program. For more information see: 
<www.catie.ca.cr/cecoeco/diplomado>. 
• Multi-stakeholder platform for assessing the impacts of value chain approaches on 
poverty and the environment: Under the auspices of the Ford Foundation, an 
international, multi-stakeholder program has been established (beginning June 2008) 
for advancing the design and testing of tools for assessing the impact of VCA on rural 
livelihoods, enterprise development, and natural resource management. Participants 
include: Ford Foundation, CATIE, CIAT, SOAS, Sustainability Institute, SNV, among 
others. For more information see: <www.catie.ca.cr/cecoeco> 
• Inter-organizational collaboration on value chain development: the Learning Alliance 
for Rural Enterprise Development in Central America established under the leadership 
of CIAT (Cali, Colombia) in 2003, in which over 30 organizations participate, 
including CATIE, CRS, SNV, CARE, and Oxfam. The Alliance promotes systematic 
learning among researchers and development practitioners on issues related to rural 
enterprise organization and value chain development. For more information see: For 
more information see: <http://www.alianzasdeaprendizaje.org/>. 
• Formation of leaders in agribusiness management: The masters program, titled 
‘International Agribusiness Management’ (MIAM), is offered jointly by INCAE and 
CATIE. This program aims to builds future leaders and facilitators for fostering 
sustainable business development with the rural sector of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Program thought in English. For more information see:  
<http://www.incae.ac.cr/EN/maestrias/mba/miam-bi-18m/>. 
Promoting smallholder linkages with the tourism sector 
For some countries, agriculture remains important: Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. But tourism has been a means of diversifying out of 
agriculture. For most Caribbean ACP countries the tourism industry represents a major, 
if not the most important, source of foreign exchange earnings14, and is estimated to 
have contributed 4.5 per cent to the GDP of Caribbean countries in 2004 (ECLAC 2005). 
However, the ACP share in regional and global tourism earnings has been declining, 
especially in relation to Spanish-speaking competitors, but for countries such as Antigua 
and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica and Saint Lucia. 
 
In the Caribbean, the tourism industry has traditionally relied on imported food due to 
lack of regular and high quality supply, among other factors. Considering that food 
represents approximately one-third of all tourist expenditures, the level of imports used 
can greatly affect the economic and social impacts of tourism (Bélisle 1983). One way to 
enhance the benefits of tourism on the local economy and promote rural development is 
to promote increased utilization of local food in the tourism industry. However, 
government agencies, donors, and NGOs have been reluctant to include tourism in their 
agendas, perhaps because of the widely-held belief that conventional tourism 
development is associated with negative social and environmental impacts, control by 
local elites or international corporations, and high levels of leakages and expatriation of 
profits. ECLAC (2005) sums up the extent to which the two sectors have been managed 
independently in the Caribbean: ‘Growth and development in the agriculture and tourism 
industries have been pursued separate and apart from each other. Indeed, even within 
the agriculture sector development of export and domestic agriculture has been mutually 
exclusive. This is indicative of the traditional approach to development in Caribbean 
countries whereby most inputs for the productive process are imported and most of the 
output is exported. Few backward and forward linkages were therefore created as policy 
and institutions were not geared toward fostering such linkages. The recent focus on 
                                          
14 Throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, the share of tourism in GDP ranges averages 43%, with a low 
of 13% in Trinidad, to high of 69% in St. Lucia (Dixon et al. 2001). With an average annual growth rate around 
3.6%, tourism is growing, in most cases, higher than GDP as a whole. 
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increasing linkages between tourism and agriculture therefore poses significant 
challenges’ (p.19). 
 
Recently, the issue of agriculture and tourist development strategies in the Caribbean 
has surfaced in the context of ‘pro-poor’ tourism development (Ashley et al. 2006). This 
approach is based on the notion that effective linkages between local agriculture and the 
tourism sector can stimulate local agricultural production, channel tourism benefits to 
the rural sector, and reduce overall food import bills. Ashley et al. (2006) identify a 
number of small-scale initiatives from the Caribbean ACP countries where hotels have 
purchased directly from smallholders and handicraft producers, sometimes with the help 
of NGOs, and other cases have been identified by ECLAC (2005) (Box 2.5). In general, 
hotels can benefit from these linkages through: more distinctive products that 
differentiate the hotel environment and enhance the brand; cost-savings (to the extent 
that local goods are less expensive than imports), and establishment of local networks of 
collaboration. However, for such linkages to deepen or expand, a number of constraints 
must be addressed, including: 
 
• Supply side: lack of sufficient, consistent and guaranteed quality local production; 
high prices of local produced foods; lack of capital, labor, investment and credit 
(technological limitations); 
• Demand side: preference for processed and imported foods by foreign-owned and 
high-end hotels; tourists’ preference for home-country foods; tourism industry’s 
distrust of local food based on sanitation, hygiene, and health concerns. Food tours 
and food festivals are a means of exploiting local culture; 
• Marketing system: failure to promote local foods; poor transportation, storage, 
processing and marketing infrastructure; and lack of communication and information 
between smallholders and tourism industry. 
 
As highlighted in DFID (2007), the successful integration of smallholders into tourism 
value chains, either directly as suppliers to hotels or indirectly as raw-material suppliers 
to local processors, requires an appropriate investment climate. In several respects, the 
Caribbean is well positioned. For example, analysis of the FDI competitiveness of food 
processing and tourism sectors in Belize, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and St Lucia 
by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) of the World Bank (MIGA 2007) highlights diverse factors of importance to 
investors: 
 
• Belize: investment incentive programs, proximity to the US, language and cultural 
affinities and favorable cost structures 
• Dominican Republic: investment incentive programs, political stability and a growing 
economy, a large well-trained labor force, geographical and internal market size 
• Jamaica: a liberal FDI policy, English-speaking workforce, good infrastructure and 
telecommunications, and proximity to the US 
• St Lucia: a liberal FDI policy, political stability, a good business environment with 
sound infrastructure and communications, and an educated workforce. 
 
For the food processing sectors in the four countries, the principal factors attracting 
investors were: access to markets and supplies, the general business environment, 
potential to recruit local staff, and relatively low costs of wages, real estate and 
construction. Investment in food processing in the region has been stimulated by local 
and global market demand trends, such as growth in demand for organic foods and for 
ethnic and specialty foods. International trade has been boosted by the preferential 
trade agreements with the US and EU. The end of such privileges is expected to have a 
massive impact on export-oriented food processing firms. Additional threats arise from 
inadequate logistics and infrastructure facilities, weak food safety controls, and 
unreliable local sourcing. 
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Recent case studies in the Caribbean highlight the difficulties for overcoming structural 
and institutional constraints to integrating smallholders into tourism value chains. In 
their analysis of agriculture-tourism links in Quintana Roó, Torres & Momsen (2004) 
argue that the advanced state of tourism development in Cancún and the failure of 
tourist planners to incorporate any agricultural development strategies in the process – 
in essence, leaving them to occur spontaneously – has severely thwarted the 
development of linkages with smallholders. Given the need for intensive investment, 
coordination, and cooperation for promoting agriculture-tourism links, an important first 
step will be to develop coordinated tourism and agricultural development policies among 
government agencies, NGOs and the private sector in Quintana Roó. (See Box 2.6 for 
discussion of the challenges and opportunities for agricultural and tourism linkages in 
Quintana Roó). In St. Lucia, Timms (2006) concludes that, although strong domestic and 
regional markets exist, the major limiting factor has been the lack and unreliability of 
supply. In general, cooperatives have been ineffective in coordinating production or 
facilitating linkages with hotels. Moreover, communication and coordination between 
wholesalers (which supply the largest hotels) and smallholders on the demand and 
supply has not lead to changes in supply patterns by smallholders or purchasing patterns 
by wholesalers (use of imports to augment lack of local supply and seasonality). He 
suggests that by improving overall supply conditions of domestic agricultural production, 
hotel purchases would increase. 
 
Clearly, more research is needed to better understand the nature of relationships 
between smallholders and the tourism industry, including issues related to power, 
culture, and history. Sheppard’s review of the various approaches for linking producers 
to markets covers a wealth of experience of how farmer organizations can link effectively 
with the private sector actors in the market chain (Shepherd 2007). He draws attention 
to the identification of market opportunities and the need for sound management of 
collective organizations, the importance of securing financial resources to meet 
‘upscaled’ business demands, and the means to develop trust between organizations and 
firms, which is the essential element of profitable and sustainable business linkages. FAO 
(2008c) draw attention to diverse cases of linkages that may be independent of 
intervening organizations but can be fostered by, for example, individual farmer-to-
trader contacts, or led by a leading farmer, or linkages initiated by private sector firms. 
Therefore, donors and NGOs can play an important role; but they are not necessary 
always, and arguably are not sufficient without the individual and/or collective initiative 
of farmers and traders. 
 
On the other hand, it has been shown elsewhere by Telfer and Wall (1996) that such 
barriers can be overcome when there is commitment by hotels to promoting local 
development and by smallholders to invest in increased production and quality control. 
In their case study, chief of the Sheraton Resort took time to investigate the potential 
use of locally-produced products, supply and purchase agreements were established. 
Through ongoing communication with local suppliers, quality standards, were established 
and maintained. Over time, the Sheraton rejected progressively fewer local products as 
the suppliers adapted to the high quality standards. However, a major challenge for the 
sustainability of these linkages is their institutionalization in hotel’s sourcing policies that 
transcend the interest and involvement of specific individuals. At the time of Telfer and 
Wall’s research, the Sheraton was purchasing food products from a variety of sources, 
including wholesalers and major agricultural markets. In this context, a critical role for 
development interventions relates to 1) reducing the costs for upgrading of quality, 
introducing new products, and adding value through processing, 2) facilitating 
smallholder organization for improved coordination and communication with the tourism 
industry, and 3) facilitating the elaboration of risk and benefit sharing agreements 
between hotels and smallholders and their organizations.  
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Box 2.7 Agriculture-tourism linkages in the Caribbean 
Ashley et al. (2006) identify several examples of initiatives to link smallholders to the 
tourism sector in the Caribbean, including: 
 
• In St. Lucia, Oxfam is working with smallholders to access markets of the hotel 
sector. In addition to helping smallholder increase production, the project is also 
supporting four smallholder-owned cooperatives to improve their marketing and 
act as intermediaries between the farmers and hotels.  
• In Tobago, the Hilton Tobago has initiated an ‘adopt a farmer’ program with the 
Mt St Georges Farmers’ Association. Once the farmers had consistent demand 
from hotels, there were able to sharply increase production.  
• In Jamaica, the Sandals Resort Farmers Programme began in 1996 with 10 
smallholders supplying two hotels. By 2004, there were 80 smallholders supplying 
various hotels. As a result of the programme, smallholders’ sales increased over 
55 times in three years, from US$60,000 to US$3.3 million. Benefits to hotels 
include a wider variety of good quality local produce and costs savings.  
 
In addition to these initiatives, the Barbados-based Agro-Tourism Linkages Centre 
was inaugurated in 2004. It aims to facilitate trade in fresh and processed foods and 
non-food agro-industrial products between smallholders and hotel and restaurant 
sectors, as well as promote the development of agri-tourism and eco-tourism 
initiatives. These isolated initiatives highlight the interest in building agriculture-
tourism linkages in the region among private and public sectors. They also highlight 
the need for a systematic, action-oriented research program to identify how best to 
design institutional arrangements for linkages, the impacts of these linkages on asset 
accumulation by smallholders, and the benefits and costs for the tourism sectors.  
 
Other examples of exploiting tourism-agriculture linkages are cited by ECLAC (2005): 
 
• ‘A programme to link tourism to agriculture was initiated in 1990 in Nevis by the 
Nevis Department of Agriculture in collaboration with the Four Seasons Resort, a 
five-star hotel whereby farmers would supply local produce to the hotel… The 
Nevis Growers Association (NGA) was formed with 12 farmers in order to facilitate 
business relations with the hotel…. 
 
‘Two locally owned all-inclusive hotel chains with home base in Jamaica have also 
developed linkages with agricultural producers in the Caribbean. The Sandals Group 
of hotels started their farmer’s programme in Jamaica in 1996. Sandals works directly 
with farmers through a farmer extension officer that they fund to improve the 
production of the farmers. Management teams from the hotels hold workshops for 
the farmers in relation to quality of produce and marketing procedures. In turn, 
farmers visit the hotels to understand the specific requirements for their products…. 
The project started with 10 farmers supplying two hotels but graduated to 80 farmers 
in 2004. Agricultural support is provided by the Rural Agricultural Development 
Agency (RADA) in terms of matching supply with demand. Sandals has replicated the 
programme in Saint Lucia where the average size of farmers’ holding is less than two 
hectares… The advantage of the Sandals programme is the security it has afforded 
farmers who produce good quality products at competitive prices….’ (pp.22-23). 
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Box 2.8 Linking smallholders with tourism: lessons from Quintana Roó 
A variety of factors have been found to constrain the development of tourism and 
agriculture linkages in Quintana Roó, Mexico: 
 
• Productive farmland is in the southern part of the state, far from Cancún, with the 
result that supply chains are long and hotel chefs and farmers do not know each 
other (in some cases, producers do not share a common language with hotel 
buyers) 
• Inconsistent and poor quality of local supplies, resulting from: shortage of capital, 
credit, and appropriate technology, lack of technical services, absence of local 
processing facilities, and no point of tourism market entry for local farmers 
• Poor coordination among smallholders, which remain primarily unorganized, 
limiting opportunities to benefit from economies of scale 
• Tourism markets are dominated by a few suppliers, thus making it common for a 
supplier to pay ‘kickbacks’ to hotel chefs and food buyers. 
 
On the other hand, opportunities do exist, which, if seized upon, may enable 
smallholders to overcome some of the constraints identified above. These include: 
 
• Agro-climatic conditions for producing several varieties of fruits and vegetables 
gives access to growing markets in the tourism, urban, and export sectors 
• Proximity to buyers represents a significant advantage: opportunity to provide 
superior quality products and specialized services such as vine-ripening, same-
day harvesting and just-in-time delivery 
• Diversification of the tourism industry: with strong demand for locally produced 
specialty foods  
• Small-scale production is appropriate for the niche and indigenous specialty 
items, which are currently in demand by new tourism market segments (eg 
ecotourism and cultural tourism).  
 
Given the present mature stage of development in Cancún, it is difficult for 
smallholders to break into already entrenched supply networks. Thus, responding to 
these opportunities requires the long-term investments in upgrading smallholders’ 
capacities, as well as in the establishment of links between various tourism and 
agricultural stakeholders, including government agencies, NGOs, local hotels, and 
restaurants, local suppliers, regional producers (ejidos), and other entrepreneurs. 
Similar considerations are likely to apply to the advanced tourism economies in the 
Caribbean. 
Source: Torres & Momsen (2004) 
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3 Case Studies  
Overview of case studies  
This section presents three case studies on agricultural development in the Caribbean. 
The case studies capture a considerable amount of the variation in strategies 
implemented in the Caribbean ACP and Central America. The three strategies examined 
here are: 1) niche market penetration, 2) value addition through large-scale processing, 
and 3) export of fresh fruits and vegetables. Table 3.1 outlines the salient features on 
these cases.  
Table 3.1 Variations in NTAE strategies and their implications for development 
Strategy Institutional 
arrangements 
for production 
and marketing 
Overall 
investment 
requirements 
Major risks 
limitations from 
development 
perspective 
Examples 
Niche market 
penetration 
Smallholders 
organized into 
RCEs (rural 
collective 
enterprises)  
Low: upgrading 
production and 
business 
capacities of 
smallholders 
Small market size, 
dependence on 
limited number of 
buyers, lack of 
production inputs  
Organic 
and/or fair 
trade coffee, 
cocoa, and 
banana 
Value 
addition 
through 
large-scale 
processing 
Centralized 
processing, 
processing and 
marketing, 
production 
largely 
independent 
from processing  
High: subsidies 
for production 
and investment 
in operation and 
maintenance of 
processing 
facility 
Highly dependent 
on scale, large 
sunk costs, 
dominance of 
large producers in 
decision making & 
benefit 
distribution 
Fruit juices, 
frozen 
vegetables, 
canned fruits 
Export of 
high value 
fresh 
products  
Exporter, which 
contracts part of 
production out 
to smallholders 
or smallholder 
organizations  
Medium: storage 
facilities, inputs, 
quality control 
and assurance 
systems 
Food safety, 
diseases/pests, 
logistics, 
protectionism in 
export markets 
Fresh fruits, 
vegetables, 
fish, herbs  
 
Case study 1 – Niche market penetration: organic cocoa in Belize  
In Belize, agricultural exports make up roughly 85% of exports. The composition of 
agriculture is dominated by a few traditional commodities, especially sugar and bananas, 
which make up roughly 75% of agricultural exports15. Non-traditional agricultural exports 
(including cocoa) account for less than 25% of agricultural exports, the most important 
being citrus16. Belize’s agricultural exports generally face major difficulties to compete 
effectively in international markets, and their trade depends heavily on preferential 
market access agreements. This is largely due to high production and processing costs 
that result from insufficient and declining throughput. For example, the banana industry 
faces high labor costs (25% of production cost) and low yields (650 boxes per acre 
compared to 1,000 boxes per acre in other Central American countries). The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries of Belize (MAF) is convinced of the urgent need to diversify 
                                          
15 According to the World Bank, the Belize banana industry contributes about 5% of GDP, 6,000 jobs (7% of 
the labour force), and 16% of foreign exchange earnings. Sugar contributes about 8% of GDP, 5,000 jobs in 
Corozal and Orange Walk, and 20% of foreign exchange earnings. The EU quota is 50,000 MT, while the US 
quota is 15,000 MT.  
16 Citrus, mostly orange and grapefruit, is produced primarily for the US market and yields about 11% of 
foreign exchange earnings. It is cultivated in Stann Creek Valley close to processing facilities in Pomona and 
Alta Vista. The citrus industry in Belize is discussed in detail in Case Study 3 of this report.  
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agricultural exports and increase the overall competitiveness of the sector, focusing its 
attention on niche markets for agricultural products, such as gourmet, ethnic, organic, 
and fair trade, as an area of strategic importance (MAF 2003). These markets represent 
the fast growing segments of the food industry, with annual growth rates between 10-
15% over the past decade.  
 
The development of the cocoa sector in Belize can play an important role in the efforts to 
promote the overall competitiveness of the export agricultural sector and sustainable 
rural development, including poverty reduction and livelihood security. However, for the 
nearly 5% of the rural population in Belize involved in the commercial production of 
cocoa, the economic benefits to date have been limited. For nearly 15 years, Belize has 
exported on average only 100,000 lbs. per year of conventional and certified organic and 
fair trade cocoa to the European market, of which roughly half was produced by 
smallholders. Cocoa production systems are characterized by low input usage, high labor 
costs, and low yields. Since the early 1990s, the smallholder cocoa enterprise ‘Toledo 
Cocoa Growers Association’ (TCGA) has commercialized the production of roughly 250 
organic producers in the Toledo District. This case study examines the role of private and 
public actors in the development of the organic cocoa industry in Belize. It highlights the 
critical role played by development organizations and private sector (namely, the UK-
based marketer ‘Green and Blacks’) in the organization and development of the 
smallholder organic cocoa production and marketing. To date, the MAF has played a 
limited role in the development of organic cocoa. This case shows the potential to 
develop niche export industries with relatively little investment, while also highlighting 
the long-term limitations which arise when interventions focus on a single crop and fail 
to address the underlying causes of rural poverty.  
Cocoa production and marketing in Belize 
International market trends in niche cocoa markets, including organic and fair trade, 
provide a relatively favorable investment climate for development of the Belize cocoa 
sector by smallholder producers. Annual growth rates for organic cocoa have averaged 
between 15% and 25% since 2000. Fair trade cocoa markets in Europe and US are also 
expanding rapidly. For example, U.K. fair trade cocoa imports increased by nearly 300% 
between 2000 and 2004. US fair trade cocoa imports, while small in comparison with 
European levels, expanded nearly 80% between 2003 and 2005. Throughout much of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, prices for certified organic and fair trade cocoa were 
stable at US$1,950 per MT, offering premiums of between 40% and 120% over prices 
for conventional cocoa sold in international markets. In contrast, international prices for 
conventional cocoa markets over the past several decades have exhibited sharp peaks 
and long, flat troughs. In general, conventional cocoa prices have been in a long-term 
downward trend in real terms since the last price peak in the mid-1970s.  
 
On a regional scale, Belize is among the smallest organic cocoa producers in Central 
America and the Caribbean, producing less than 1% of the region’s total production 
(Table 3.1). TCGA is the only producer and exporter of certified organic cocoa in Belize 
and one of only three smallholder cocoa enterprises in Central America and the 
Caribbean with both organic and fair trade certification. Nevertheless, since the early 
1990s, organic production has made up a significant share (30%-50%) of total cocoa 
exports from Belize. Between 1998 and 2005, the volume of cocoa exported varied 
between roughly 50,000lbs and 70,000lbs per year (Figure 3.1). The sharp decline in 
production in between 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 cocoa years was the result of 
Hurricane Iris that struck the Toledo District in October 2001, damaging as much as 85% 
of the cocoa trees.  
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Figure 3.1 Belize organic cocoa bean exports, 1998/99-2005/06  
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Source: TCGA  
Table 3.2 Salient features of organic cocoa production (certified and in 
transition) in Central America and the Dominican Republic  
Country Number of 
households 
Cocoa 
enterprises  
Certification Output 
(000 
lbs/yr) 
Productivity 
(lbs/acre) 
 
Dominican 
Republic 11,000 
CONOCADO, 
YACAO, 
APROCACI 
Organic,  
fair trade 15,400 469.5 
Guatemala 3,000 APROCA In transition 818 82.8 
Nicaragua 6,500 COCOANICA Organic 682 46.0 
Panama 2,000 COCABO Organic 546 36.8 
Honduras 3,000 AHPROCOCOA In transition 518 52.4 
 
Belize *900 TCGA 
Organic,  
fair trade 72 124.0 
 
Costa Rica 1,000 APPTA 
Organic,  
fair trade 68 27.6 
Total 27,400   18,103  
* Only 220 cocoa producing households were certified organic in 2007. The remaining producers are expected 
to complete the transition to organic production by 2008. 
 
Although Belize has a high variability in productivity among producers, the average yield 
of the country is one of the highest in the region, with Guatemala (124 lbs/acre and 83 
lbs/acre, respectively). This is mostly explained by the fact that Moniliasis has severely 
impacted production in Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras. Moniliasis has 
recently appeared in Belize and Guatemala, but has not spread sufficiently yet to cause 
similar reductions in productivity as in the rest of Central America. In contrast, the 
Dominican Republic has the highest yields in the area (469 lbs/acre), due in large part to 
an absence of Moniliasis and adequate crop management (Siegel 2006). Clearly, there is 
urgent need to invest in measures for reducing the eventual impact of Moniliasis. TCGA 
members, although informed of the potential impact of Moniliasis and aware of the 
required management, are not taking the appropriate measures to control this disease. 
Without quick and decisive measures, Moniliasis could cause the collapse of the cocoa 
industry in Belize, with productivity losses of up to 80% (as in the case of cocoa 
production in the Talamanca region of Costa Rica). TCGA needs to develop a strong 
strategy to motivate producers to increase control management practices. If effectively 
managed, productivity losses may be reduced to around 15%. 
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A 2005 sample17 of TCGA members’ production practices suggests that relatively little 
was invested in the management of plant nutrition: 94% of the producers do not apply 
fertilizer, 4% (2 producers) apply fertilizer but they do not indicate the type of fertilizer 
and 2% (1 producer) apply organic fertilizer (Donovan et al. 2007). When producers 
were asked why they do not apply fertilizers, most of the answers were: ‘because they 
are organic producers’, ‘organic rules’, ‘because they are not suppose to use chemicals’, 
‘does not have money to purchase inputs’, ‘their soil is fertile’. These responses may 
suggest that producers are confused with the organic principle which requires a 
sustainable management of the soil, and the restoration of nutrients removed at harvest. 
While there is a lack of investment in soil fertility improvement, there are alternatives to 
conventional techniques which require a lower financial investment, but will be more 
labor demanding, which is the use of leguminous shade trees.  
Organic cocoa and rural livelihoods  
Between 50-75% of cocoa production in Belize is carried out by small producers 
(average less than 3 acres per household) in the Toledo District. Endowments of 
livelihood assets (natural, human, social, physical and financial capitals) among TCGA 
members generally favor the small-scale production and commercialization of dried and 
fermented organic/fair trade cocoa beans. Human and social capital endowments for 
cocoa production and commercialization are among the strongest following years of 
investments and capital formation by cocoa producers, private investments, and 
government and donor interventions. Physical capital endowments are low, but the 
current form of cocoa production and commercialization does not require major physical 
capital endowments. With regards to income sources, non-agricultural, off-farm 
employment is a key component among organic cocoa producers (Table 3.2). Nearly 
35% of the sampled households reported non-agricultural, off-farm employment as their 
most important income source. On-farm production is diverse, with households often 
combining several livelihood activities, particularly corn, cocoa, and banana production. 
In such a diverse production system, cocoa was not mentioned as an important source of 
income by about three quarters of the sampled households.  
 
Table 3.3 identifies expected livelihood outcomes and the related vulnerability context 
for the three principal livelihood components of organic cocoa producers (cocoa 
production, on-farm production other than cocoa and off-farm employment). Cocoa 
provides a relatively low-input complementary source of income for most producers. The 
vulnerability context for cocoa production is characterized by several actual or potential 
shocks or adverse trends, such as a major spread of Moniliasis among organic 
plantations and the possibility that the one and only international buyer, Green & Blacks 
(G&B), reduces cocoa purchases. On-farm production other than cocoa provides an 
important source of income and, if diversified, increases resilience of producers vis-à-vis 
price fluctuations of certain products. Off-farm, in many cases non-agricultural, 
employment is a key element in the livelihood strategies of most producers, especially 
among newly-affiliated members, which also helps to buffer income shortages due to 
price reductions and/or off-season for the principal products. In many cases, it is the 
combination of various on-farm and off-farm income sources that helps reduce 
vulnerability of producers, and investments of human and financial resources in cocoa 
production and commercialization need to be carefully balanced against investments in 
other key livelihood components. In fact, cocoa production may become less attractive if 
its opportunity costs rise, for example when road construction towards Guatemala opens 
up new market outlets for alternative crops with potentially higher returns and/or higher 
livelihood compatibility. 
 
                                          
17 Primary data was to be collected from a random, stratified sample of 10% of TCGA-affiliated households 
(approximately 90 households); the sample was to be stratified according to 2 types of TCGA members: those 
with 3 years or less of membership and those with 4 years or more. Information was collected in the Districts 
of Toledo, Stann Creek and Cayo by MAF and TCGA extensionists. 
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Table 3.3 Ranking of income sources by TCGA member households (n=52) 
 Most 
important 
income 
source 
Second 
most 
important 
income 
source 
Third 
most 
important 
income 
source 
Considered 
important, 
but not 
among top 
3 sources 
Not 
considered 
important 
Off-farm 
employment 
18 2  2 30 
Corn  6 6 5 1 34 
Cocoa 4 7 1 1 40 
Banana 3 2  1 46 
Citrus 2 1 1  50 
Rice 2 3 3 2 44 
Cattle 1 1   50 
All spice 1 1 1  49 
Beans  2 2 2 48 
Coconut 1 1   50 
On-farm 
day labor 
1 1   50 
Source: Donovan et al. (2007) 
 
Table 3.4 Livelihood components, outcomes and vulnerability context for 
organic cocoa in Belize  
Main livelihood 
components 
Livelihood outcomes Vulnerability context 
Cocoa production 
and 
commercialization 
• Relatively secure source of 
cash income for majority of 
producers (financial capital) 
• Income generated through 
self-employment (financial 
capital) 
• Reduced land insecurity 
(natural capital) 
• Sustainable management of 
natural resources (natural 
capital) 
• Price increase for conventional 
cocoa 
• Decrease in premium/price of 
organic/fair trade cocoa 
• G&B unable to purchase all 
cocoa 
• Price of other agricultural 
products of commercial 
importance 
• Increased opportunities for non-
agricultural employment 
• Spread of Moniliasis 
• Natural disasters (fires) 
On-farm 
production and 
commercialization 
other than cocoa 
• Significant source of cash 
income for majority of 
producers (financial capital) 
• Household consumption 
(financial and human capital) 
• Sustainable management of 
natural resources (natural 
capital) 
• Increased opportunities for non-
agricultural employment 
• No-fixed contracts – prices 
subject to market fluctuations 
• Soil degradation 
• Climate change 
• Natural disasters 
Off-farm, non-
agricultural 
employment 
• Major source of cash income 
for majority of producers 
(financial capital) 
• Macroeconomic conditions 
• Employment policies of local 
firms 
Source: Donovan et al. (2007) 
Rural enterprise development by organic cocoa producers  
Since 1993, TCGA has focused on the production and marketing of certified organic and 
fair trade cocoa in close partnership with the UK-based cocoa marketer G&B (Box 3.1). 
 34 
The G&B-TCGA partnership has been important for branding of the Maya Gold chocolate 
bar and for positioning G&B as a socially responsible business 18 . With considerable 
backing from G&B and donor and government agencies, TCGA is currently in the 
processes of upgrading its businesses administration capacities and technical services for 
expanding organic production volumes.  
 
TCGA is formally registered as an NGO and therefore unable to accumulate or distribute 
profits. TCGA is governed by a Board of Directors (BoD), made up of elected members 
which meets on a monthly basis. The BoD plays an active role in routine business 
operations, including the organization of cocoa purchases from members and the 
maintenance of infrastructure. Major issues and strategic decisions are put to the 
membership at the annual general meeting. The General Manager is charged with the 
daily operation of TCGA and supervision of the professional staff. An agronomist ensures 
that the organic inspections are completed according to UK Soil Association guidelines, 
conducts internal inspections and trains and manages the extension team and the 
nursery workers. The Compliance Officer manages the internal control systems and 
coordinates organic inspection and certification. All these paid positions began in 2006 
with funding from the MAF-CARD project. (Previously G&B Project Manager had assumed 
the role of General Manager.) However, the CARD project expired in late 2007 and the 
sustainability of these positions is not known (as of 2007, no funding source had been 
identified). Over the short-term, however, donor and government may be needed to 
maintain current staffing levels.  
 
 
 
The annual operational budget of TCGA is approximately US$110,000. Major funding 
sources are grants and commissions from the sale of organic/fair trade cocoa 
(US$0.16/lb.), and to a much lesser extent, proceeds from membership fees and sale of 
agricultural tools and supplies. Recently, a policy was implemented to increase the 
membership fee from a one-time lifetime payment of US$5, to an annual payment of 
                                          
18 G&B has received numerous awards and accolades from industry and consumer groups for its work with 
TCGA in establishing the Maya Gold chocolate brand, including the prestigious 1994 World-aware Business 
Award, www.worldaware.org.uk. 
Box 3.1 Milestones in the development of TCGA 
1984 – USDA project ACPP begins, offering training for cocoa cultivation 
1986 – TCGA officially registered with the Government of Belize (GoB) 
1988 – USAID project TAMP begins, providing training, inputs, and in-kind loans for 
the establishment of cocoa – 75,999 cocoa seedlings were distributed 
1992 – Only buyer, Hummingbird-Hershey’s Ltd. stopped buying cocoa beans due to 
dramatic changes in world cocoa markets 
1993 – UK-based chocolate marketer Green and Blacks (G&B) offers to buy all TCGA 
production for their new product ‘Maya Gold’ 
1994 – G&B’s Maya Gold chocolate bar launched in UK  
2001 – Hurricane Iris hits the Toledo District, inflicting major damage on the cocoa 
crop – estimated 85% of the cocoa trees destroyed 
2004 – With assistance from G&B, TCGA acquires US$425,000 grant from DFID for 
expanding production (mainly through increased membership) 
2005 – Membership increased to 897 members farming, producing 70,000 lbs per 
year 
2006 – Financial support received from GoB-MAF’s CARD project for hiring of 
professional General Manager and agronomist, among others 
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US$5 per year. The fee has been considered necessary to cover the cost of organic 
certification. In return, TCGA provides the following services to its registered members: 
 
• Links with international buyers in specialty cocoa markets  
• Access to certification (organic and fair trade) 
• Technical services on quality aspects and on farm diversification 
• Guarantor for credit from credit union  
• Political advocacy, especially as related to land tenure issues (see Box 2.3). 
 
A rolling 5-year contract with G&B guarantees a market outlet for cocoa at organic and 
fair trade premium prices. All growing and primary processing activities are carried out 
on farm by grower-members with little or no investment in infrastructure or technology. 
In 2006, TCGA received from G&B US$.89/lb. for fermented and dried cocoa delivered to 
the TCGA warehouse in Punta Gorda. TCGA withheld US$0.16/lb. to cover social 
investments and operating expenses, translating into a price paid to its growers of 
US$0.73/lb. By early 2008, G&B had raised the price paid to TCGA to US$1.48/lb., which 
in turn allowed TCGA to pay its members US$1.15/lb., while capturing US$.33/lb. for 
social investments and operating expenses. Prices received by TCGA members compare 
favorably to prices received by members of other smallholder cocoa enterprises in 
Central America (see Table 3.4). Only organic and fair trade certified cocoa producers in 
Nicaragua receive higher prices, due principally to a special contract with the German 
chocolate manufacturer Ritter that currently pays more than US$3,500 per ton. But G&B 
buys up all cocoa produced by TCGA members irrespective of its quality. Moreover, TCGA 
members benefit from technical and financial assistance provided directly through G&B 
or indirectly through projects facilitated by G&B. 
Table 3.5 Cocoa prices paid to producers in Central America  
Smallholder cocoa enterprise Price paid to producers 
APROCACAHO, Honduras US$1.15/lb. fermented 
US$0.94/lb. conventional 
CACAONICA, Nicaragua US$0.96/lb. conventional 
US$1.07/lb. transition year 1 
US$1.21/lb. transition year 2 
US$1.46/lb. organic 
APPTA, Costa Rica US$0.84/lb. dry organic 
TCGA, Belize US$1.15/lb. organic/fair trade 
COCABO, Panama US$0.90/lb. conventional 
US$1.00/lb. second class 
US$1.05/lb. first class 
Source: PCC Project, CATIE 
 
In 2003, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), through its Business 
Linkages Challenge Funds, awarded a 2-year project grant (US$425,000) to G&B and 
TCGA. This project provided financial resources to increase production volumes through 
increased productivity of existing members and increased area under cocoa cultivation 
(addition of new members). Between 2004 and 2006, membership levels more than 
tripled: from 220 to 897. There are at least a further 95 producers who have not yet 
registered, but who have planted more than 100 acres and who should be harvesting 
and selling in about three years. All new members are required to comply with 3-year 
mandatory transition period for the conversion to organic production systems. Services 
are provided to TCGA members for facilitating the conversion process, including 
extension (training, field inspection, farmer consultation) and credit (provision for cocoa 
seedlings, materials for nursery establishment, and as a guarantee to members for loan 
procurement from other lending institutions). During this period, G&B has agreed to buy 
all cocoa in transition at organic/fair trade prices. This cocoa is passed along to G&B’s 
parent company (Cadbury-Schweppes) for use in conventional chocolate production. 
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Investments in enhanced genetic material and more effective cocoa management are 
likely to result in increased on-farm productivity. A 25% increase in productivity, would 
translate into an increase in production from 72,000 lbs. to 347,500 lbs. and an increase 
in the average annual amount paid to producers from US$2,300 to US$2,800.  
Lessons learned 
Given the recent investments in expansion of organic cocoa production in Belize, 
combined with the overall favorable market environment for organic and fair trade cocoa, 
future investments in cocoa sector development should focus on TCGA and their 
members. The cocoa sector in Belize highlights both the opportunities and limitations 
promoting NTAEs under relatively favorable conditions. Among the success factors: 
 
• Long-term partnership with UK-based cocoa importer and G&B has provided a low-
risk environment for TCGA cocoa production expansion. TCGA has received access to 
such buyer-provided services as co-financing for projects, subsidies for certification 
and operating funds, and support for administration. 
• Organic cocoa production systems practiced among TCGA members are compatible 
with livelihood strategies to the extent that they require relatively low labor inputs 
and infrastructure and imply low production risks.  
• Political-legal framework with several favorable features: no taxes on income or 
exports, direct financial support through government-administered development 
projects, and preferential market access to US, European and Caribbean markets.  
• Relatively high yields vis-à-vis other organic cocoa exporters in other Central America. 
This is due mostly to very low incidence of Moniliasis. However, organic cocoa yields 
in Belize are nearly 4 times less than those reported in the Dominican Republic. 
• TCGA has been able to pass nearly 95% of the organic/fair trade price to members. 
Prices received by TCGA members are between 50-60% higher than prices perceived 
by conventional cocoa producers, and 15-20% higher then those received by 
members of other smallholder cocoa enterprises in Latin America.  
 
Despite these achievements, the organic cocoa sector in Belize lacks long-term 
sustainability from both a technical and business perspective. Current TCGA production 
levels are among the region’s lowest, and do not allow for covering fixed costs of TCGA 
administration and extension services. The sector is highly susceptible to significantly 
reduced productivity when the fungal disease Moniliasis takes hold in Belize. TCGA 
depends heavily on international buyers and development projects to subsidize 
administration costs and provide technical services to members. Compared to other 
long-established smallholder cocoa enterprises in Latin America (eg CONOCADO in the 
Dominican Republic, El Ceibo in Bolivia, CACVRA in Peru, and APPTA in Costa Rica), 
TCGA lags behind considerably in terms of value adding, market diversification, and 
overall level of business consolidation. There is need to increased production levels, 
enhance on-farm productivity, and focus resources on business development. Among the 
major challenges facing the development of a sustainable cocoa sector in Belize are: 
 
• Increase on-farm productivity and quality through long-term investments in cocoa 
management (including disease cultural practices, shade and cacao pruning) and 
better genetic material.  
• Moniliasis could cause the collapse of the cocoa industry in Belize, with productivity 
losses of up to 80% (cf cocoa production in the Talamanca region of Costa Rica). 
Similar impact could be expected in Toledo if new strategies are not considered.  
• Identify viable opportunities for adding value to cocoa through processing for national 
(tourism) markets. Limited information exists on opportunities to add increased value 
to cocoa beans through production of semi-processed and processed cocoa-based 
products. 
• Strengthen capacities of TCGA to provide effective business, marketing and technical 
services to its members. TCGA has been severalty under capitalized, with 
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management and technical staff highly dependent on external funding to cover 
salaries and operating costs. The legal constitution of TCGA (association) limits future 
opportunities for business development that capital accumulation and payments of 
dividends. Major operational and strategic decisions are taken by Board of Directors, 
rather than by professional managers.  
• Promote long-term investment in communication and coordination platforms to build 
trust between MAF and TCGA. To date, limited government attention has been 
focused on cocoa sector development as compared to import-substitution crops like 
rice and vegetables and major foreign exchanged earning export crops such as citrus. 
Access to business development and financial services is highly limited. There is 
urgent need to address the frustration over impasse on land tenure clarification, and 
disagreement about appropriate use of project funds (eg CARD) and management of 
natural resources (fire permits, logging concessions), among other issues.  
Case study 2 – Value addition through processing: citrus juice in 
Belize  
The citrus industry is the most significant agro-enterprise in Belize, earning more than 
US$50.6 million in the 2003/2004 crop year (CGA 2004). Primary citrus production 
accounts for 13% of agricultural GDP, while the citrus processing sector accounts for a 
staggering 30% of manufacturing GDP. Moreover, the relative high-value of processed 
citrus products makes the industry a top earner of foreign exchange – second only to 
tourism. Like other export-oriented agriculture industries in Belize (eg bananas, cocoa), 
the citrus industry is relatively new, developing since the 1960s at various intensities, 
and dominated by smallholders. The Belize citrus industry originated with the 
investments of an expatriate entrepreneur who made small shipments of fresh grapefruit 
to U.K. in the 1920s (Moberg 1991). After World War II, the citrus industry expanded 
with the opening of two factories that processed the regions’ citrus as juice and fruit. It 
was not till the 1970s that the industry began to take off, due to world market conditions 
and political mobilization among the district’s citrus growers (Kroshus Medina 1987).  
 
 
 
For the Belizean citrus industry, an early major challenge was reaching a balanced 
bargaining position with the processing firms. For decades the country’s two processing 
companies – one the subsidiary of Nestlé and the other controlled by foreign investors 
Box 3.2 Competition in the regional orange juice market 
Orange juice is a high value product with markets mainly limited to countries such as 
the US, and competition is strong between producers. The orange crop in Brazil is 
much larger than the US crop but higher processed utilization combined with higher 
juice yields allows US juice production to rival that of Brazil. Most US imports are 
frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) because it is relatively cheap to transport. 
Orange growers in the US face considerably higher costs of production compared to 
Brazil, Mexico, and Belize. One study estimates the US cost of oranges delivered to 
processors at US$0.75 per pound solids versus US$0.45-US$0.49/pound solid in 
Brazil, Mexico and Belize. The costs faced by US producers generally reflect the prices 
for labor, land and machinery. Import tariffs raise the price of Brazilian juice. The 
current US tariff on FCOJ from Brazil is US$0.32 per pound solids. Transportation costs 
and the Florida equalization tax add an additional US$0.12/pound solid to the cost of 
product. Thus, the cost of Brazilian FCOJ delivered with all taxes and tariffs paid is 
around US$0.96 per pound solids, which is slightly higher than comparable costs in 
the United States. Belize enjoys relatively low grower costs and preferential access to 
the US market. However, processing costs in Belize are roughly twice those of Brazil. 
The high processing costs result, in large part, from insufficient throughput of raw 
material. In addition, energy and labor costs in Belize are significantly higher.  
Sources: Donovan & Krissoff (2004), Donovan (2002), Zabeneh (1999) 
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and a few of Stann Creek’s largest citrus producers – were thought to be colluding in 
setting producer prices. By the mid-1970s, as sales of frozen concentrated orange juice 
(FCOJ) rapidly increased in export markets, producers had learned of the discrepancy 
between strong world demand and the low prices paid by the processors. While seeking 
elected positions in the Citrus Growers’ Association (CGA), smaller-scale producer used 
the issue of pricing practices to push for enforcement of the Citrus Ordinance of 1967, 
which authorized government regulation of the citrus industry19. The two processors 
resisted CGA’s efforts to enforce the Ordinance. In response, a broad-based movement 
among smaller-scale producers demanding contract prices that reflected the trends 
prevailing in world markets. During a 1975 ‘growers’ strike’ in which most producers 
withheld fruit from the processors, the production of FCOJ and its shipment for export 
were brought to a halt. The three-month stalemate forced government intervention to 
protect the country’s second largest source of export earnings. The government’s 
intervention resulted in: 1) the calculation of producer prices based on a pricing formula 
requiring public disclosure of processors’ assets and profits20 and 2) the requirements 
that processors purchased all of a growers’ fruit. The pricing formula precluded any 
further collusion between the processors and insured that high world market prices are 
passed on to producers (Kroshus Medina 1987). Increased returns and a rapid expansion 
on citrus acreage followed the implementation of the price formula and the guaranteed 
purchase arrangement (Barham 1992).  
 
In the early 1980s, a second wave of citrus expansion in Belize was wrought by two 
external events: 1) a series of severe freezes in Florida that transformed the US from a 
net exporter of citrus products into a net importer of FCOJ and 2) the elimination of 
tariffs on citrus into the US from Caribbean Basin countries under the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative. At the urging of the Florida citrus growers lobby, the US had imposed tariffs on 
imported FCOJ in the 1950s, amounting on average to 40% of Florida production costs 
(Barham 1992). Prior to this time, Belize had difficulty selling its citrus production in the 
US and had depended on protected marketing agreement to sell it FCOJ in Europe and 
the Caribbean. CBI opened the lucrative US market to citrus from Belize and other 
Caribbean producers. Now Belize was able to market FCOJ for just under the Brazilian 
price and still make a profit. As a result, the proportion of Belizean citrus production sold 
in the US jumped to 60%, though Belizean FCOJ imports still accounted for less than 1% 
of the FCOJ sold in the US (Barham 1992). Preferential access to the US market for 
Belizean oranges raised prices from Bz$6.85 per box in 1982/1983 to Bz$10.75 per box 
in 1983/1984.  
 
The higher prices stimulated investment in citrus and many growers began to invest in 
expansion in acreage. The government facilitated the expansion of citrus production by 
providing state-owned land on lease to both large and small investors (Kroshus Medina 
2004). According to Kroshus Medina (2004), a random sample of citrus growers in 1989 
showed that 73% had expanded their citrus holdings. Moreover, in 1990, 22% of the 
workers included in random survey samples of the unionized labor force in the industry 
had also begun planting citrus. CGA membership rose from 361 in 1985 to over 600 in 
1994.  
 
                                          
19 The CGA was officially sanctioned in 1967 with the passage of the ‘Citrus Ordinance,’ which granted the state 
regulatory powers over the industry, including requiring all who delivered fruit for processing to become a 
member of the CGA and pay a cess to finance its operation (Krosus Medina 2004). In addition to political 
advocacy on the part of growers vis-à-vis processors and the government, the CGA facilitates the collection 
and transportation of oranges from farm gate to processor. It also operates a credit program for small farmers 
to purchase annual production inputs. Each farmer’s forecasted citrus production, which is confirmed by the 
CGA, serves as the collateral for a loan. CGA’s smallholder credit program has operated since 1995, and has 
disbursed US$2.9 million, with a default rate of less than 1 percent (Donovan 2002).  
20 The pricing formula means that Belizean growers receive a price that is approximately linear function of the 
international futures’ prices. As the FCOJ price rises above a certain threshold level, the growers’ proportion of 
the price rises, subtracting transportation, marketing and processing costs. Similar price formulas, or 
participatory schemes, are the norm in both Brazil and Florida (Barham 1992). 
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Currently, the industry focuses on the production of bulk FCOJ for export to international 
markets and within the Caribbean. Belize accounts for between 5-10% of total US FCOJ 
imports and is the dominant supplier of FCOJ to the Caribbean market. The industry also 
produces and exports relatively small amounts of not-from-concentrate (‘fresh’) orange 
juice (NFC). Most NFC is currently sold in the regional market. At present, roughly 96% 
of the country’s citrus crop is exported as orange or grapefruit juice concentrate to 
Caribbean, European, and US markets. During the 2003/2004 growing season, 559 
citrus producers in Belize delivered citrus for processing, of which roughly 80% were 
smallholders21 delivering less than 5,000 boxes per year (Table 3.5). The vast majority 
of citrus processed in Belize, however, is supplied by a few medium and large scale 
producers: combined they accounted for roughly 93% of total citrus deliveries. In 
addition, the industry provides employment for 445 in the processing sector and over 
4,000 seasonal workers (Donovan 2002). 
Table 3.6 Citrus deliveries to juice processing plants in Belize according to size  
Boxes delivered 
(03/04 growing 
season) 
Number of 
growers 
% of all 
growers 
Total 
deliveries  
(’000 boxes) 
% of total 
deliveries 
101,000 and over 15 2.7 3,280 52.1 
5,001-100,000 95 17.0 2,647 41.2 
1-5,000 449 80.3 490 7.6 
Total 559  6,417  
Source: Belize Citrus Growers Association 
 
Orange production increased rapidly during the late 1990s, as trees planted earlier in the 
decade – in response to unusually high prices following freezes in Florida – came into full 
production (Table 3.6). During the 1990s, fruit delivered for processing increased by 
50%. Production leveled off around 2000 as the trees reached maturity. Oranges made 
up the bulk of the increase, as grapefruit deliveries remained roughly the same. The 
1990s, however, were also a period of declining fruit prices: orange prices fell by 22% 
and grapefruit prices by 36%. According to industry sources, the break-even point for 
orange production in Belize is around Bz$5.75 per box, indicating that during the latter 
half of the 1990s growers were unable to cover all of their production costs (Donovan 
2002). The drop in prices reflects the general decline in world orange juice prices 
resulting from increased competition and changes in consumer preferences away from 
FCOJ towards NFC, which consumers generally perceive as being of higher quality 
(Donovan & Krissoff 2003). Since the 2000/2001 season, the overall trend in boxes 
delivered has been declining. This has resulted from the insufficient application of 
production inputs, and a decline in grove maintenance. This is true especially for small 
and medium sized citrus operations who tend to be more vulnerable to price downturns 
and thus more likely to forego investments in citrus and seek alternative livelihood 
strategies, such as shifting production to another crop or migrating to urban centers. In 
an effort to provide incentives for increased quality, a pound-solids payment system was 
introduced in the 2002/2003 growing season, which bases payment on the sugar content 
in fruit. Previously, payments to growers were based solely on box weight.  
 
Since its beginnings, the Belizean citrus industry has been entirely focused on regional 
and export markets. Competition in the major international orange juice markets is 
based on low price, which means that Belize industry can compete only where it has 
preferential access. The average yield for Belizean citrus plantations ranges from 175 to 
250 boxes per acre, well below the world’s standards production rate of 400 boxes per 
                                          
21 Smallholders, in general, are important for the Caribbean citrus industry. In Jamaica, smallholders (those 
delivering 5,000 boxes or less per year) make up 98 percent of all citrus farms and supply 42 percent of citrus 
for processing. In Trinidad there are only 150 growers that currently supply citrus to the processing industry, 
cultivating groves from 5-100 acres. Citrus production and processing is also carried out in Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, and Guyana. Central American producers of FCOJ are Costa Rica, and to a lesser extent, 
Honduras. 
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acre (Kroshus Medina 1997). In the case of smallholders, low yields may be due to 
failure to apply recommended quantities of fertilizer. In general, however, yields are low 
in Belize due to agro-climatic conditions, as large producers that apply the prescribed 
dosages of agro-chemicals achieve yields of only 350 boxes per acre. Due to the lower-
priced Brazilian product in Europe, as compared to the US, producers in Belize have 
faced difficulties unable to expand in the European market in either the FCOJ or NFC 
segments. Faced with increased competition in Europe, Belize has turned to the US. 
Between 1999 and 2001 Belizean FCOJ exports to the US increased 40%. The US tariff 
on Brazilian FCOJ is between 40-50% ad valorem. Belize processors enjoy duty free 
access to the US market through the CBI.22 Donovan (2002) addresses the hypothetical 
case of complete removal of the US tariff of Brazilian FCOJ and its impacts on citrus 
production in the Caribbean. His estimates suggest that the local industry’s share of the 
Caribbean FCOJ market would fall by nearly 75% due to increased competition from 
lower-priced imports from the US and Brazil. In the US market, the reduced US tariffs on 
Brazilian FCOJ would nearly drive out CARICOM from the market. Complete trade 
liberalization nearly puts an end to FCOJ production in CARICOM. The relatively high 
transportation costs for NFC allow NFC production to continue in the region, albeit at 
significantly reduced levels. Roughly 70% of shipments are destined for the US, while 
the rest are sent to Caribbean and European markets. 
Table 3.7 Volume and price for citrus delivered to processing plants in Belize  
Orange Grapefruit Season 
 Boxes delivered 
(000 boxes)* 
Price/box 
(Bz$)** 
Boxes delivered 
(000 boxes) 
Price/box 
(Bz$) 
90/91 1,203 10.58 792 5.84 
91/92 2,408 9.12 1,228 6.24 
92/93 1,793 4.62 1,015 5.34 
93/94 2,020 6.15 833 4.73 
94/95 3,133 8.03 1,214 5.70 
95/96 3,166 8.07 1,159 4.80 
96/97 4,555 4.82 1,418 3.30 
97/98 3,898 5.65 1,236 2.10 
98/99 4,438 5.67 1,328 2.38 
99/00 5,590 5.03 1,391 4.13 
00/01 5,734 4.37 1,461 4.05 
01/02 4,123 5.88 1,231 4.74 
02/03 4,046 1.14/ps 1,078 4.23 
03/04 4,947 0.94/ps 1,479 3.84 
* 1 box grapefruit=80 lb., 1 box oranges=90 lb. 
** Exchange rate (March 12, 2008): 1.00 $US = 2.00 Bz$  
Source: Belize Citrus Growers Association 
 
As international markets have become more competitive, the Caribbean market has 
become increasingly important to Belize. A Common External Tariff (CET) of 40% ad 
valorem protects the Caribbean industry from lower-priced fresh and processed citrus 
products. The CET allows the industry to capture prices 20-30% over global prices 
(Donovan 2002). The majority of regional exports are destined for Jamaica, Barbados 
                                          
22 The CBI went into effect on January 1, 1984. It was extended in 1990, 2000, and 2002. It is currently set to 
expire on September 30, 2008, or the date, if sooner, ‘on which the FTAA or another free trade agreement as 
described in legislation enters into force between the United States and a (CBI) beneficiary country’. In the 
case of CBI countries included in the recently-negotiated CAFTA-DR agreement (eg Honduras, Dominican 
Republic, and Costa Rica), CBI benefits will become permanent. The US Embassy in Belize has recently 
expressed ‘its commitment to seeking out an extension of this framework.’ For more information, see: 
http://belize.usembassy.gov/july_19.html. 
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and Trinidad. Trade with Jamaica has increased significantly in recent years, as the 
Jamaican citrus industry has been heavily damaged by the citrus disease Tristeza (Box 
3.3), which is threatening the entire Caribbean region. However, the small size of the 
regional market and relatively high costs for ocean transport may limit the possibilities 
for further significant gains in this market. 
 
 
Cooperation and conflict among citrus stakeholders  
The development of the citrus industry in Belize is, in part, a story of cooperation and 
conflict between and among producers, processors, and the government (labor has 
largely been on the sidelines). Among producers, large variations in financial and natural 
resource endowments have emerged as a source of conflict. Citrus producers classify 
themselves as either small or large growers, using 50 acres as a boundary between the 
categories (Kroshus Medina 1997). Although the acreages and incomes of smallholders 
vary widely, they tend to share a sense of being disadvantaged vis-à-vis large citrus 
growers (ibid.): 
  
Box 3.3 The Jamaican citrus industry struggles with Tristeza  
The citrus industry is one of the most economically important agricultural industries 
in Jamaica, behind sugar, bananas and coffee. The citrus industry involves a large 
number of small-scale growers cultivating between 1 to 4 hectares of citrus. These 
growers account for an estimated 95% of the approximately 3,800 growers and 30% 
of the estimated 25,000 acres in citrus. Oranges represent about 84% of total 
Jamaican citrus production, with grapefruit making up the majority of the remainder. 
The key market for Jamaican fresh citrus is domestic. The domestic market is 
controlled by a large number of informal traders that operate throughout the year. 
Most smallholders participate in this market. Domestic fresh prices are 2-3 times 
higher than prices offered by the citrus processors. During the main harvesting 
period, juice processors are the primary purchasers of citrus either for export as fresh 
fruit or for processing into FCOJ, NFC or other drinks for domestic and regional 
markets. There are 2 plants that process FCOJ, 4 plants that process NFC, 5 fresh 
fruit packaging houses, and a host of cottage industries that process oranges into 
freshly-squeezed orange juice for sale directly to consumers and the tourist industry. 
Processors purchase between 30%-35% of total annual orange production. 
 
Since the early 2000s, citrus production has been in sharp decline due to the impacts 
of the Citrus Tristeza Virus (CTV). In 1992, the disease confirmed as being present. 
Nearly all of commercial citrus is planted on CTV-susceptible sour orange rootstock. 
The Jamaican Citrus Growers Association (JCGA) estimates that 80% of citrus is 
infected with CTV. According to the Agriculture Ministry, production fell from 183,184 
MT in 1999 to a low of 136,738 MT in 2002. More recent figures indicate there was a 
further decline to less than 126,000 MT in 2005. Decline in orange production and a 
vibrant fresh fruit market have reduced the supply of fruit available for processors. 
Processors have compensated for the shortfall in domestic supply by importing FCOJ, 
usually from Belize. Imported concentrate is reconstituted, packaged and sold in 
domestic and regional markets. In 2001, the Agriculture Ministry, with US$ 10 million 
from the Caribbean Development Bank, promoted the replanting of 6,000 acres of 
citrus using certified CTV resistant planting material. However, the project’s impacts 
on future production levels may not be as high as expected: according to the 
president of the JCGA only 2,000 acres of citrus had been resuscitated under 
rehabilitation programme which ended in 2007. In 2008, the (JCGA) presented a 
proposal for the further citrus resuscitation and replanting for roughly US$23 million. 
(Jamaica Gleaner 2008). 
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• Access to land: Most available land is held by the government in forest reserves that 
can be leased and later purchased at below market prices. Although both large and 
small growers may apply for government-owned land, large growers are more likely 
to benefit from political connections (often the result of making significant 
contributions to election campaigns) to obtain choice parcels of fertile land close to 
roads, while small growers frequently settle for land on hillsides a half-mile or more 
from a road.  
• Access to mechanization: Large scale growers clear the forest with bulldozers, while 
smallholders use axes and machetes. Stumps left behind manual clearing prevent the 
use of machinery to clean the groves, while orchards cleared with bulldozers can be 
cleaned mechanically. Small growers often plant a short-term cash crop to recover 
some of the costs of clearing land before they plant citrus. The high costs of clearing 
land, planting, and maintaining the trees for five years until they reach maturity force 
most small growers to plant parcels of less than one acre at a time. Smallholders 
whose plantations can accommodate a tractor with a mechanical mower must often 
wait their turn for the CGA's services. 
• Access to processing services: Smallholders may be held to higher standards for fruit 
maturity requirements than large growers. The longer growers wait to begin to 
harvest, the more fruit they lose to birds or to premature fruit drop, but the 
processors argue that growers profit more from selling a smaller amount of mature 
fruit at a high price than they would from selling a larger quantity of green fruit at a 
lower price. Farmers accept this argument in principle; smallholders, however, 
believe that the maturity requirements are not applied equally to all growers because 
large growers use their high volume of production to pressure the companies to 
accepting green fruit.  
 
Increased efficiency in production could be best achieved through the promotion of large 
growers over smallholders23. Kroshus Medina (1998) chronicles the critical role played by 
the Belizean government in promoting the participation of smallholders in the citrus 
industry at key moments in the industry’s development process. In 1979, one of the two 
Belizean processing companies and the largest private citrus grower together contacted 
the UK’s Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) to request funds to rehabilitate 
their orchards. A CDC team dispatched to evaluate the Belizean industry recommended 
that citrus production be increased as rapidly as possible by giving top priority to 
rehabilitating neglected groves, thus directing most of the funds toward large producers, 
and establishing a new large-scale citrus estate. In 1980, the Belizean government was 
asked to guarantee a loan from the CDC that made rehabilitation its top priority. When 
news of the proposed program was leaked to smallholders, they convened a special 
meeting of the CGA at which they accused the government of favoring the large-grower 
minority. A resolution was passed that the loan funds be directed toward smallholders to 
finance expansion of their citrus holdings. Concerned about potential biases towards 
smallholders, the government agreed to incorporate the CGA into negotiations with the 
CDC. During negotiations that stretched over more than a year, small growers made 
repeated attempts to limit large growers’ access to the loan funds, while the CDC 
opposed such exclusions, arguing that they would slow the program and jeopardize its 
goal of strengthening the citrus industry. Ultimately, the government resolved the 
conflict by siding with the majority: It agreed to guarantee the loans only on condition 
that expansion be given priority over rehabilitation and that funds be directed toward 
small growers rather than a new citrus estate.  
 
A second loan program, with expansion as its priority, was initiated with a 1988 World 
Bank offer of a US$1 million loan to develop 1,000 acres of new citrus in Belize. The 
                                          
23 The average yield for Belizean citrus plantations ranges from 175 to 250 boxes per acre, well below the 
world’s standards production rate of 400 boxes per acre (Kroshus Medina 1997). In the case of smallholders, 
yields are relatively lower due to failure to apply recommended quantities of fertilizer. In the case of large 
producers that apply the prescribed dosages of agro-chemicals yields may reach 350 boxes per acre.  
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World Bank's priority was further diversification of the national economy away from 
dependence on sugar. The Belizean government negotiated an agreement with the World 
Bank that would direct the funds toward smallholders; the government proposed funding 
500 acres of new citrus holdings in 20-acre blocks and 500 acres in 5-acre blocks to 
encourage small growers to expand up to the 20-acre level designated as economically 
viable. However, officials at the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) – a quasi-
government development bank - which was to administer the loan, recommended that 
the funds be lent to one or two large growers to expand several hundred acres each, 
asserting that it would be much more efficient to fund a couple of large projects that 
would have the same overall effect. Through several years of negotiations leading up to 
the program's implementation, the government, concerned with both increasing 
production and maintaining the political support of small growers, insisted that the 
program be directed toward smallholders. The final agreement allocated funds to both 
small and large producers, and, again, the government made land available to both 
small and large growers to facilitate expansion.  
 
However, the highly strategic nature of the citrus industry, both at home and abroad, 
requires that governments be fully informed of potential responses by various 
stakeholders (producers, processors, government, and certain international producers 
and processors) and be prepared to coordinate among them for the best possible 
outcome24. Barham (1992) describes how an opportunity to dramatically increase citrus 
production in Belize was lost due to conflicting objectives and the inability of the Belizean 
and US governments to effectively intervene. In 1984, Belizean producers initially heard 
of news of plans by Coca-Cola Foods (CCF) to invest more than US$100 million in 
establishing 25,000 acres of citrus plantations in north-west Belize (equivalent of CCF’s 
holdings in Florida) and citrus processing capacities. The deal was important for the 
Government of Belize (GoB) (increased foreign exchange earnings), as well as the US, 
which sought a success story for its newly implicated CBI (ibid.). Reactions among 
Belizean producers were mixed: on one hand, the investment increased the likelihoods 
on an extension of CBI – vital for the survival of the industry, on the other hand, 
exceptions granted to CCF from the Citrus Ordinance and taxes that fund the CGA 
threatened the delicate relations between processors and producers in the Stann Creek 
district. In particular, producers feared that processors would be in a prime position to 
demand their own exemption from the Ordinance on the basis on the precedent and the 
unfair competitive advantages provided to CCF. Upon protests by the CGA, the GoB 
withdrew the exemption from the Ordinance and CCF responded by seeking further 
negotiations on the exemption. Complicating matters further, was the Florida growers’ 
effort to squash the deal by highlighting the negative environmental consequences of 
citrus planting for tropical forest conservation and lobbying the US congress to limit 
government-supported insurance for international investments in citrus production. In 
1987, CCF withdrew from negotiations with the GoB. Barham (1992) argues that the 
responses by both the Belize and US governments were ill-prepared for promoting the 
CCF investments in such a strategic industry as the citrus: in the case of strategic 
industries ‘a more refined approach should help avoid the naive pursuit of liberalization 
policies in sectors where laissez-faire outcomes will be counterproductive’.  
Towards increased efficiency in processing  
In the late 1990s, the former Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) offered to 
purchase majority shares in the two juice processing plants in Belize. Given the 
                                          
24 Barham (1992) suggests that on three levels competition in the citrus industry is strategic: At the local level, 
the efforts of citrus growers’ associations in Florida, Brazil, and Belize seek to establish contractual norms or 
industry-wide participation schemes that govern relations between producers and processors and reduce the 
potential bargaining imbalance of a few processors versus numerous producers. At the national level, citrus 
growers’ associations, especially in Florida and Brazil, push trade and subsidy policies aimed at influencing 
investment and production decisions especially in the other country. At all levels, but especially at the 
international level, existing growers have a strong interest in acting pre-emptively to prevent new citrus groves 
investment that expands industry capacity.  
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difficulties faced by Belize and its citrus industry at the time, citrus growers voiced few 
complaints about the purchase of the companies by foreigners or the imposition of a 
monopoly in processing (Kroshus Medina 2004). CGA officials hoped that the CDC’s 
experience in managing citrus operations in Costa Rica and selling its products in global 
markets would enable it to operate the new consolidated company with greater efficiency, 
which, in turn, would lead to higher fruit prices. However, the CDC’s purchase and 
consolidation of the processing companies yielded mixed results. The CDC won new loan 
funds from the European Investment Bank in 2001 to rehabilitate orchards and update 
processing. Some of these funds were invested in processing – namely, in a system to 
recover citrus pulp. However, world market prices for citrus products continued very low, 
as did the fruit prices received by Belizean producers.  
 
As a result of the partial privatization of CDC and resulting policy shifts, CDC looked to 
divest its holding in citrus processing in Belize and elsewhere. CDC engaged the CGA in 
negotiations for the sale of the newly consolidated processing company. The CGA 
established the Belize Citrus Growers Association Investment Company, Ltd. to acquire 
the processing company on its behalf, and in late 2002, after two years of negotiations, 
the CGA signed an agreement to acquire 99% of the company’s shares (Kroshus Medina 
2004). At the same time, however, the CGA assumed the company’s US$19 million debt. 
The new processing company was named Citrus Products of Belize, Ltd. (CPBL). In 2002, 
CPBL announced plans to increase efficiency in the face of low prices and high debt by 
terminating workers at both factories, with severance payments, thus allowing for a 
‘restructuring’ of the workforce. In 2006, CPBL sold 46% of its equity to Banks Holdings 
Ltd. of Barbados and Blue Waters Ltd. of Trinidad for US$25 million, with the growers 
retaining 51%. The sale of equity may have been aimed at providing financing, as well 
as know-know in branding and marketing, for diversifying CPBL’s products into higher 
value added products, such as fruit drinks, aimed at regional markets.  
Lessons learned 
The development of the citrus industry in Belize stands out as unique among Caribbean 
ACP countries (relatively large scale and focus on processing) and internationally (active 
participation of smallholders in all aspects of the industry). The government has played a 
major role in ensuring the incorporation of smallholders into the expansion process 
(provision of land and credit). Efforts to increase efficiency of citrus production and 
processing in Belize are clearly necessary to ensure the industry’s survival in the face of 
potential free trade in FCOJ between Brazil and the U.S, as well as from the threat of 
regional producers, such as Cuba (see Box 3.4). Key lessons from this case include: 
 
• The effective incorporation of smallholders in a highly strategic industry where scale 
in production and processing is critical was possible, in large part, to due 1) grower 
organization in the CGA, 2) political legal framework that favored smallholder 
production (Citrus Ordinance), and 3) long-term government commitment to 
smallholder development  
• However, protecting smallholders’ interests came at the cost of increased efficiency 
in production and processing. In strategic industries such as citrus, this have been 
viable given preferential access to the US market and high levels of tariff production 
in the Caribbean market.   
• The organization of smallholders into the CGA for political advocacy, research, and 
provision of services to smallholders, played an especially important role in 
facilitating dialogue between the Government and citrus growers, between small and 
large citrus growers, and between citrus growers and processors.  
• The role of labor has largely been ignored in the development of the Belizean 
industry by the government, CGA, and processors. This is most recently reflected in 
the restructuring of labor agreements at the processing plant. In general, citrus labor, 
much of which comes from Guatemala and other parts of Central America, has been 
less organized than growers.  
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The key stakeholders in Belize citrus have been ill-prepared to deal with the complex 
strategic interactions at the local, national and international levels for promoting the 
long-term development of the industry. The industry is especially vulnerable to changes 
in market and political environments. Only recently has attention been focused on 
innovation and diversification. Central American juice markets have been ignored over 
the past decade, despite their rapid growth.  
 
 
Case study 3 – Fresh produce exports: vegetables from Guatemala 
Long-term, effective participation in the fresh fruit and vegetable markets depends, in 
large part, on the ability of producers and exporters to address a series of issues related 
to logistics, scale, and capital endowments. Specific issues include: 1) need for relatively 
large amounts of production inputs and services; 2) advanced managerial and marketing 
skills; 3) certification and quantification requirements; 4) vertical coordination to deliver 
perishable products to markets or processing facilities in time; 5) long ‘product gestation 
periods,’ especially for fruit crops; 6) access to future markets or insurance to withstand 
the price and supply fluctuations associated with many high value crops; and 7) 
requirements for high ‘quality’ of labor (Carter et al. 1995). Most of these issues tend to 
work against smallholders, due to low capital endowments, limited information, and lack 
of services. However, the last one, quality of labor, can favor smallholders. This refers to 
the fact that many high-value vegetable and fruit crops are highly responsive to constant 
and careful monitoring of plant health; careful weeding, pruning and irrigation; 
harvesting based on assessments of when individual pieces of fruit and vegetables are 
ripe; and careful, efficient handling (Collins 1995). Since many of these activities (i.e., 
pruning and trellising) cannot be mechanized, there may be very limited economies of 
scale in production of crops that require high quality labor. While large-scale producers 
can, theoretically, monitor and supervise workers in ways that ensure a high quality of 
labor, Carter et al. (1995) argue that such supervision will often be prohibitively costly.  
Box 3.4 Role of foreign investment in promoting the Cuban citrus industry 
Following the revolution, Cuba’s government promoted citrus production as part of a 
program to diversify the country's sugar-dominated economy. Citrus plantings and 
production grew throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with production reaching a million 
MT in 1990, making Cuba the world’s 14th largest citrus producer. However, the 
industry faced a major downturn with the collapse of Eastern European economies. 
Citrus production fell by about 45% in the early 1990s. In response, emphasis was 
placed on expansion of processing. Efforts were also made to increase foreign 
investment in the industry. Israel reinitiated investments in 1991 that increased 
productivity and product quality for a joint Cuban-Israeli production enterprise. By 
1997, this joint venture produced over a third of Cuba’s total citrus production. Other 
investments in citrus have come from Greece, Great Britain, Chile, and Italy. 
Cooperative investments, along with improved-technology processing equipment 
imported from Europe, have also benefited the citrus processing industry. As a result 
of these changes and improved incentives, citrus yields and production have 
rebounded to 1980s levels. Cuba’s infrastructure, however, remains in poor 
condition, investment resources and production inputs continue in short supply, 
foreign exchange remains limited, the trade deficit continues, and foreign debt 
remains high. In 2001, Cuba entered into a free trade agreement with the Caribbean 
Community and Common Market (CARICOM) – whose members include most of the 
Caribbean ACP countries. An initial version of the agreement allowed for free trade in 
citrus. However, subsequent negotiations between CARICOM and Cuba resulted in 
citrus being included on the list of sensitive commodities exempt from tariff 
reduction.  
Source: Kost (2004) 
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In general, fresh vegetable export is much more capital intensive than both traditional 
and subsistence crops. Several studies find that fresh vegetable production and 
marketing is increasingly being carried out by large-scale producers and processors, and 
smallholders are being excluded (Reardon et al. 1999, Dolan & Humphrey 2000, 
McCulloch & Ota 2002). Dolan and Humphrey report that by 1998 the share of 
smallholder production in the export of fresh vegetables from Kenya to Europe fell to 
less than 30%. Recent research indicates that fewer than 2% of smallholders in Kenya 
are directly engaged in the sub-sector (Bawden et al. 2002). In Costa Rica, Mannon 
(2005) describes how fresh chayote exports during the 1990s became increasingly 
dominated by larger-scale producers, as smallholders were ill-prepared to deal with 
quality and safety issues and have low bargaining power with buyers (see Box 3.5).  
 
 
 
A major constraint for smallholder participation in vegetable export markets is related to 
quality and safety, coupled with an expansion in the number of non-tariff measures that 
developed countries apply to agricultural products. Fruits and vegetables are among the 
agriculture products more frequently affected by sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures (Unnevehr 2000). Box 3.6 details the decline of smallholder participation in 
melon exports from Honduras due to limitations in addressing pesticide toxicity issues.  
 
Box 3.5 Declining smallholder shares in chayote exports from Costa Rica  
Beginning in 1983, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) provided 
Costa Rica with considerable financial resources for agricultural diversification and 
export promotion. As a direct result of this funding, NTAEs from Costa Rica 
skyrocketed, with chayote exports alone increasing from 5.2 million pounds in 1980 
to 13.5 million pounds in 1988. Because chayote is also produced for local markets, 
exporters were easily able to identify producers willing to produce for export. 
Exporters were not prone to establish contracts with smallholders, as they needed 
neither protection from lost investments nor incentives to get smallholders to 
establish (expand) production. Due to the limited size of the US chayote market, 
exporters preferred a ‘looser’ relationship with producers where they were not 
committed to buying produce on a regular basis. Smallholders benefited in their 
access to the US market, which fetched far higher prices than in local markets. On 
the other hand, they were perceived by exporters as being reluctant to adopt 
increasingly strict US quality standards. Given the limited resources of smallholders 
and the withdrawal of USAID and government support in the early 1990s, these 
standards were difficult to meet and smallholders began to face higher levels of 
product rejection. Lacking contracts, exporters passed any losses from produce 
rejection directly to smallholders. To complicate matters, international demand for 
ethnic foods is unstable and the competition intense. When demand fell, chayote 
exporters simply did not buy from smallholders. Most smallholders responded to 
these risks by making increased use of local markets for their produce, in 
combination with the export market. However, the response of smallholders to export 
market risks conflicted with the need of exports for a consistency, quality assurance, 
and produce traceability. Exporters began relying less on smallholders in their supply 
networks and more on larger-scale producers with more stable resources to weather 
international market fluctuations and a better reputation for quality assurance. 
Quality concerns were becoming increasingly important in Costa Rica in the late 
1990s with respect to the US markets, to which 50% of all exports were destined. In 
Costa Rica, 102 detentions were reported from 1984-19994, costing approximately 
US$ 411,000 in lost revenue. 
Source: Mannon (2005)  
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One exception to this trend is the smallholder-dominated fresh winter vegetable sector 
(eg cauliflower, broccoli, snow peas) of highland Guatemala. Smallholders began 
growing fresh vegetables in the mid-1970s, starting with snow peas, cauliflower, and 
broccoli and later expanding to French beans, mini-squashes, berries, and other exotic 
crops. During the 1980s, the share of agricultural exports coming from fresh fruits and 
vegetables grew from less than 6% in 1980 to more than 22% in 1992. Snow pea export 
grew from 1,678 MT in 1986 to 16,511 MT in 1995. Ninety-percent of Guatemalan snow 
peas are produced on farms of less than 1 ha by 20,000 indigenous growers (Hamilton & 
Fischer 2005). In response to structural adjustment and trade liberalization programs, 
Guatemala introduced policies in favor of fruit and vegetable production, such as export 
facilitation procedures, subsidy programs, and fiscal reforms. Trade agreements such as 
CBI also played a critical role in promoting fruit and vegetable exports. In the early 
2000s, an initial decline was recorded as growers and exporters suffered losses from 
high rates of product detention and rejection due to SPS violations. The market then 
rebounded; exports reached 18,236 MT in 2003. About half of the exported snow peas 
are marketed through exporters that contract with smallholders, the remaining volume is 
sold by smallholders independently through local intermediaries. One study estimates 
that the low entry costs for both producers and exporters of fresh snow peas resulted in 
a highly competitive market in which growers captured $40 of the destination priced for 
snow peas in the mid-1990s – a high proportion for a perishable export crop (Gulliver 
2001). Despite the technical difficulties of meeting SPS export standards, 13,000 small-
scale snow-pea producers are currently affiliated with exporters, cooperatives, or 
community groups that provide training and technical assistance in meeting food safety 
and other production quality standards (Hamilton & Fischer 2005).  
 
 
Box 3.6 Decline in smallholder participation in melon exports from Honduras  
In the mid-1980s, producers in western Honduras invested in the production of fresh 
melons for export to the US with the help of USAID and multi-national corporations. 
By 1989, there were 3 cooperatives farming 520 ha, 3 transnationals farming nearly 
2,760 ha and 4 Honduran companies farming 1,200 ha. Honduras became the leading 
melon exporter in Central America. However, reliance on pesticides in the production 
of fresh melons generated significant ecological disruption, as well as reduced 
involvement of smallholders. The overall lack of understanding of the impact of 
pesticides and their implications for sustainable development, even among trained 
technicians, generated pesticide resistance pests, secondary pest outbreaks, and 
widespread plant diseases, with major repercussions for many melon producers. 
Smallholders suffered the worst effects of the ecological disruption. The dramatic 
decrease in the number of smallholders, the increase in average farm size and the 
shift by some companies away from contracts into estate production, all suggest that 
the opportunities for smallholders are limited when quality control is weak.  
 
Development strategies that call for the introduction of NTAEs that are heavily 
dependent on pesticides, and encourage smallholders to participate in these 
development efforts, can seriously jeopardize smallholder production, while risking 
the health of smallholders and farm workers and degrading the environment. Under 
the conditions commonly found in the developing countries, the pesticide technology 
often appears to accelerate the negative redistribution of wealth and resources within 
and between countries, while undermining the socioeconomic and ecological 
foundation for future efforts to achieve more sustainable and equitable development. 
The volatile connections between the ecological, economic, social, and political 
dimensions of technology-induced problems suggest that economic growth and 
political stability may only be sustainable when questions of social equity and 
ecological viability are brought to the very forefront of the development process.  
Source: Murray (1991) 
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Factors facilitating smallholder’s participation in the vegetable exports 
As previously suggested, where production is highly labor-intensive and where products 
must meet strict quality standards, smallholders can have advantages vis-à-vis larger 
producers based on lower wage bills and their ability to ensure ‘quality’ labor. However, 
savings in labor alone are unlikely to fully overcome the effects of smallness and low 
capital endowments. In this context, the conversion of smallholder organizations into 
rural community enterprises (RCEs) becomes vital for increasing efficiency in production 
and marketing, accessing external services and inputs, and providing critical services, 
such as credit. Overall, experiences in RCE development in Guatemala, and elsewhere in 
Central America and the Caribbean, have been mixed. However, one RCE in highland 
Guatemala has stood out in the literature. The Cuatro Pinos cooperative provides 
technical assistance in export quality standards, purchases the crops, packs the produce 
and sells it directly in Miami. Profits are returned to cooperative members as annual 
dividends. The cooperative also provides members with access to credit, reduces risk 
through management of a price-band systems and insurance through limited liability on 
loans. There are local collection centers in each of the eight communities that participate 
in the cooperative. Members pre-select, weigh and store their produce at the collection 
centers and the amounts received are registered. The cooperative headquarters has a 
central collection center and a plant for post-harvest operations, including pre-freezing, 
grading, cleaning and storage. According to Santacoloma and Riveros (2004), the 
cooperative has built business relationships around trust by providing credit, hiring 
producer family members to work in the packing plant, and offering maternity leave 
benefits and health care. By 1987, Cuatro Pinos had expanded to 1,150 members, 
compared with 177 members in 1979. Cooperative members grew nearly 300 ha of 
export vegetables in 1985 (von Braun et al. 1998), on plot sizes ranging from 0.3 ha to 
around 2.25 ha. Vegetables processed and marketed by the cooperative come from 
members (80-90%) and local intermediaries (10-20%) (Santacoloma & Riveros 2004).  
 
There has been little critical discussion of the economic and social performance of Cuatro 
Pinos or of its development process over the past three decades. One exception is work 
by Carletto and colleagues (1999). They argue that the ability of Cuatro Pinos to assist 
production with credit and technical assistance has suffered from discontinuity in 
management and high default rates on pending debts as a consequence of extensive 
adverse selection during years of easy credit and low prices. Based on statistical analysis, 
they found that cooperative membership, once corrected for selectivity bias, and did not 
have a positive impact on the household’s decision to continue growing fresh fruits or 
vegetables. This disappointing role of the cooperative is due to its increasing managerial 
and financial difficulties. This has had a substantial impact on the cooperative’s ability to 
respond to members’ increasing demands for credit, insurance, and information. The 
shift in priorities by international donors who had so enthusiastically promoted NTAEs in 
the 1980s, and the consequent withdrawal of financial support to NTAE activities, 
contributed to weakening the cooperative. At a time when the importance of access to 
credit, insurance, and information grew as a consequence of increasing capital 
requirements, higher risk, and lower productivity of NTAEs, the role of the cooperative as 
a source of liquidity, insurance, and technical assistance was reduced, weakening its 
mitigating role precisely when it was most needed to overcome anti-smallholder biases 
in the production of NTAEs. The result was a vicious cycle that smallholders found 
difficult to overcome. Achieving sustainable and equitable rural development via 
promotion of NTAEs thus requires addressing the issues of effective institutional support 
for credit, insurance, technical assistance, infrastructure investments, and control of 
accumulation of toxicity.  
 
Government and non-government organizations played a catalytic role in the beginning 
for the rapid use of potential economic benefits from NTAE production. In Guatemala the 
promotion of NTAE exports, including fresh fruit and vegetable exports, has been an 
integral part of US economic assistance policy since the early 1980s. PROEXAG, a USAID 
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financed NTAE promotion agency, has provided essential services like production and 
market research and contacts with US buyers. USAID was also instrumental in opening 
up the export channel by providing seed capital to the company, Alimentos Congelados, 
S.A. (ALCOSA). USAID, along with other development agencies, stimulated the 
formation of the Cuatro Pinos cooperative, implemented its programs, and assisted in 
securing access to exporters. Among the actors working with USAID and other 
development organizations in the development of fresh vegetables export sector during 
the 1980s and 1990s were (von Braun et al. 1998): 
 
• A private company (ALCOSA) provided the technical know-how and the export 
channel to the US market, including infrastructure facilities as cold storage.  
• Guatemalan public-sector agencies facilitated agricultural technology (Instituto de 
Ciencias y Tecnologías Agrícolas) and credit directly to smallholders (Banco Nacional 
de Desarrollo Agrícola.  
• Smallholders invested in the formation of Cuatro Pinos, which organized export 
vegetable production and provides field level extension, input supply produce 
collection, selection, and storage.  
 
In addition to external investments by government and non-government organizations, 
local endowments of social assets have played a critical role in the development of the 
Guatemalan fresh vegetable sector. Hamilton and Fischer (2005) discuss how 
smallholders were able to deploy social assets to strengthen their market position and 
ways in which market participation can strengthen community, including household labor 
availability, parallel market experience outside the nontraditional sector, commitment to 
maintaining traditional production practices, and high levels of social capital: 
 
• Household labor: The availability of low cost household labor and the requirement of 
high field and supervisory labor inputs figured centrally in most early calculations of 
the comparative advantage for smallholders. Hamilton and Fischer find that 
household members are unlikely to forgo alternative income opportunities or 
schooling to work in household production. And the presence of local employment 
opportunities in fruit and vegetable production and processing appears to offer a 
positive local alternative to the deployment of unskilled labor to wage labor on 
distant plantations. However, the low opportunity cost of family labor also reflects 
that relatively low levels of education and of well-paying nonagricultural employment 
in the highlands.  
• Parallel market experience: Smallholders have been able to leverage previous 
marketing experience in the textile and regional agricultural markets to maintain 
control of their means of production while participating in export markets. Women, in 
particular, have transferred skills and social capital gained through selling agricultural 
and non-agricultural products in regional bulking centers and other markets to the 
commercialization of new NTAEs. Moreover, maintaining their visibility in marketing 
activities has helped to protect women’s control of household productive assets and 
incomes despite men’s greater access to NTAE market structures. 
• Commitment to traditional production practices: Highland smallholder producers have 
been able to retain effective as well as nominal control of their land and labor. Most 
continue to produce traditional milpa (maize and beans) crops for households 
consumption and because traditional agricultural practice is an important component 
of identity. Hamilton and Fischer document the diverse crop management strategies 
employed in several highland communities, including a willingness to incorporate 
alternative pest management practices rather than simply applying chemical 
practised at the non-sustainable levels. 
• Social capital: In the highlands of Guatemala, Hamilton & Fischer argue that 
relatively high endowments of social capital facilitated the exploitation of new market 
opportunities, with its melding of traditional and non-traditional economic and 
cultural relations. The overall experience of cooperatives and producer associations 
has been mixed in highland Guatemala, and access to membership is uneven among 
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and within communities. A few RCEs in Guatemala have been able to capitalize on 
generations of normalized economic reciprocity and high levels of trust (eg Cuatro 
Pinos). Positive results achieved by NTAE strategies elsewhere in the region (eg 
CONACADO in the Dominican Republic) suggest that social capital does facilitate 
organizing to achieve better crop management, market opportunities, and 
environmental sustainability in export sectors.  
Challenges for future development of fresh vegetable exports by smallholders  
In the late 1980s, issues related to food safety and pesticides began to weaken 
Guatemala’s position in the US market for fresh fruits and vegetables (Julian et al. 2000). 
In 1992, Guatemala was ranked fifth among countries supplying fresh vegetables in the 
United States. However, in 1998, Guatemala was ranked 13th. The fresh vegetable 
sector appears to have taken a more casual approach to SPS concerns, thus leaving their 
economic fate in the hands of the importing country’s inspection personnel and 
regulatory policies (Box 3.7 describes a similar situation related to raspberry exports 
from Guatemala). According to Murray and Hoppin (1992), by the mid-1980s, some 
Guatemalan exporters had begun to encounter increasing problems associated with the 
use of pesticides. A wide range of pesticides were readily available to Guatemalan 
producers and pesticide use was largely uncontrolled. The increasing rate of pesticide 
application was becoming a serious concern among exporters and producers. Pesticide 
costs were becoming a major part of production expenses in some crops, exceeding 
US$2,206 per hectare in snow peas. These difficulties contributed to the escalation of 
production costs and to the reduction of NTAE profitability over time, affecting most 
particularly the small farmers who have weaker access to credit and higher risk aversion. 
Furthermore, increasing price uncertainty, import bans due to pesticide residues for 
Guatemalan snow peas in the United States and the prohibitive cost of pesticide residue 
spot checks have also had an impact on the profitability of NTAE production in the 1990s. 
The consequence was a gradual shift back to the production of traditional crops for the 
domestic markets, which had been partially abandoned in the early stages of NTAE 
adoption. 
 
Export shipments were being rejected by the FDA upon entry into the US due to illegal 
pesticide residues. Rejections were relatively infrequent during 1985-1987, with a rate of 
only 4.1%. But detention rates jumped as the FDA began increasing surveillance in the 
latter part of the decade. By 1990, rejection of Guatemalan produce was an alarming 
27.3%. As in the case of Costa Rica (see Box 3.5), some exporters responded by 
reducing or abandoning the purchase of fresh vegetables from independent smallholders 
and began taking greater control over producer pesticide use and other farming practices. 
By reducing the number of growers they worked with, providing increased technical 
assistance, and in most cases, directly providing pesticides to producers, exporters were 
better equipped to meet US residue standard and other regulatory or market 
requirements. According to Hoppin (1991), growers associated with companies with 
better resources and extensive US contacts used pesticides in ways less likely to result in 
violations of US residue limits than did members of cooperatives or the more 
independent growers under the satellite farming structure.  
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Impacts of fresh vegetable export promotion 
Considerable analysis has been carried out on the impacts of fresh vegetable production 
and marketing on smallholders and rural communities. Carletto et al. (1999) examine 
smallholders’ adoption of fresh fruit and vegetables in the early 1980s. They claim that 
contrary to previous agro-export boom in the region (eg cattle, pineapple, cotton), the 
Guatemala fresh fruit and vegetable sector has been accessible to farmers regardless of 
the size of their land holdings. However, while initially accessible to all farmers, over 
time, the better endowed households were more land owned and better quality land 
tended to persist in growing NTAEs as toxicity increased, implying higher capital costs 
and higher risks. The extent to which smallholders can position themselves in fresh fruit 
and vegetable markets depends greatly on the characteristics of the production and 
marketing systems for a given product. For example, in the case of snow peas, Murray 
and Hoppin (1992) highlight that smallholders appear to have remained the dominant 
Box 3.7 Impacts of a food safety on the Guatemalan raspberry industry 
The Guatemalan raspberry industry began exporting to the US in the late 1980s, 
filling a market niche in the spring and fall when supplies were low. By 1996, 
Guatemalan raspberry exports were increasing rapidly, up 113% from the previous 
season. That spring and early summer, the US Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) and Health Canada received reports of more than 1,465 cases of 
food-borne illness from Cyclospora, a protozoan parasite. Although no one died, the 
large number of cases generated substantial adverse publicity. Initially, investigators 
linked the outbreak to California strawberries, but they finally decided that it was 
associated with Guatemalan raspberries.  
 
By 1997, the Guatemala Berry Commission (GBC), a grower’s organization, had 
developed a system to characterize a farm’s risk potential: only low-risk farms could 
export in the following season. However, the plan had no enforcement mechanism or 
traceability system. That spring there was another large outbreak of food-borne 
illness in the US and Canada that implicated Guatemalan raspberries. After consulting 
with the US-FDA, the GBC voluntarily stopped exporting raspberries to the US in May 
1997. In November 1997, the Guatemalan government created a commission with 
enforcement power to lead the effort to improve food safety. But in December, the 
US-FDA, not yet convinced the problem was resolved, issued an import alert, denying 
all Guatemalan raspberries entry into the US An import alert for a specific product 
from an entire country, rather than from specific firms, was an unusual response, and 
one used only after all other means of resolving the problem were exhausted.  
 
In 1999, the US allowed entry of raspberries produced under a mandatory joint 
program of the GBC and the government of Guatemala. The program requires export 
growers to comply with a detailed program of safety practices and to pass frequent 
inspections by the Integral Program for Agricultural and Environmental Protection, a 
Guatemalan public-private organization, as well as undergo FDA audits. A code is 
applied to each container of raspberries, which allows it to be traced back to an 
individual grower. In 2000 there were two outbreaks traced back to one Guatemalan 
farm, which was removed from the MPE program. No outbreaks have been associated 
with Guatemalan raspberries since 2000. To help meet the cost of the MPE program 
and public relations work, the GBC charges producers a fee per box of exported 
berries. While Guatemala worked to increase food safety, other competitors, such as 
Mexico, made inroads into the US market. Prior to the 1996 outbreaks, the size and 
growth of Guatemalan and Mexican exports to the US were similar. Currently, Mexico 
supplies about half of US raspberry imports.  
Source: Calvin et al. (2003) 
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suppliers due to their organization into collective enterprises and the especially high 
labor requirements for snow pea production.  
 
Hamilton & Fischer (2005) also consider that, in general, the production of vegetables 
for export has brought some real gains for smallholders in the Guatemala highlands. A 
majority of smallholder vegetable producers been able to remain in the volatile export 
market; employment in the sector is well-regarded and widespread among non-
producers and has contributed to a modest reduction on ethnically biased land 
concentration. Although gender relations of production remain asymmetrical, they find 
modest gains in women’s control over household resources. Smallholders and farm 
workers themselves largely perceive that production of these crops as a positive addition 
to the economic strategies currently available to them, viewing it as both a means for 
self-advancement and as an opportunity to use their land and labor in ways that 
preserve affective ties to community and reinforce key elements of their cultural heritage. 
Total farm and non-farm employment in the fresh fruit and vegetable sector have varied 
from some 40,000 to over 110,000. Recent estimates for field labor in snow peas range 
from 1.5 to 2.5 million person-days per four-month growing and harvesting cycle. For 
broccoli, less field labor is required per hectare: 435,500 person-days for an area slightly 
smaller than for snow peas. In 2001, wages in the sector averaged around US$154 per 
month, while wages in traditional agricultural sectors averaged only US$92 per month. A 
majority of smallholders have been able to market and more than one-third have been 
able to increase their landholdings. Both inter-households and intra-household 
distributions of benefits proved less asymmetrical than anticipated.  
 
Von Braun et al. (1980) address two issues in the context of fresh vegetable production 
in Highland Guatemala: 1) does fresh vegetable promotion lead to equitable distribution 
of benefits and 2) does it promote better articulation of the poor (i.e., creation of 
employment, demand for services, infrastructure, education, and participation in 
decision making and priority setting in the development process). Regarding the first 
issue, von Braun and colleagues conclude that the promotion of fresh vegetable for 
export has indeed worked in the right direction. Some peculiarities of the crops and the 
conditions at the location have produced this outcome. Because of their diseconomies of 
scale, fresh vegetable production was adopted by smallholders in the poorest area of the 
country, creating employment for the smallholders and local landless, substantially 
increasing rural income and increasing food security and consumption. The favorable 
effect of the NTAE strategy for smallholders largely depends upon vegetable crop 
characteristics, which are very different from those of other products such as cotton, 
conventional coffee, and beef. These products have apparently positive returns to scale 
in production and are produced more efficiently by large-scale producers. Regarding the 
second issue, they find that institutional changes combined with the expansion of export 
crop production in a cooperative scheme are forces leading toward social articulation. 
Noteworthy results are the strengthening of cooperation among smallholders, increased 
interaction between village communities, development of local trading and 
entrepreneurship, and related build-up on economic power in the rural areas by the 
smallholder-based growth. Central to the conditions that allowed for positive relationship 
between growth and ‘social articulation’ of the poor are: diseconomies to scale in 
producing the export vegetables and the ecological conditions in the Western Highlands 
along with the labor market situation.  
Strengthening research & development for fresh fruit and vegetable promotion  
The Guatemala case shows long-term poverty reduction and rural development can be 
achieved through the promotion of fresh fruits and vegetables when the conditions are 
right. However, replication of the Guatemala experience presents a challenge in the 
Caribbean and elsewhere, given the overall complexity of fresh horticultural production 
and marketing systems and the related need for long-term external investments in 
production and marketing by the private and public sectors. In general, there is urgent 
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need to identify viable options for reducing the investments required for the positioning 
of smallholders in these markets. However, investments in research and development 
related to fresh fruits and vegetables at the national, regional and international levels 
are woefully inadequate25. On the technical side, research and development gaps related 
to fresh horticultural production systems include (Weinberger & Lumpkin 2007): 
 
• Genetic improvement: Yield improvements in fruits and vegetables have been lower 
than in cereals. More emphasis will have to be placed on the development of hybrid 
varieties, using the natural vigor of hybrids to fight stresses of disease, heat and 
drought. Nutritional content, product quality and safety are also important aspects of 
breeding efforts.  
• Safe and environmentally friendly production: Fruits and vegetables together account 
for the major share of the global pesticide market. Pesticide residues are often 
attributed to the failure of producers to restrain application before harvesting and use 
of prohibited pesticides. Several studies have reported high heavy metal 
contamination in fruits and vegetables.  
• Seed sector development: A major limitation to fruit and vegetable production in 
many developing countries is the unavailability of quality seeds. Smallholders 
themselves often produce seeds of locally preferred or traditional varieties. Without 
proper seed production, processing technology, and quality assurance, seeds are 
often contaminated by seed transmitted pests/diseases and are genetically diverse.  
• Post-harvest management: Horticultural production, particularly in tropical 
environments, often suffers from post-harvest losses of up to 25% depending on the 
crop and season. The high perishability of horticultural crops restricts the ability of 
producers to store them to cope with price fluctuations. Export revenues are also 
reduced owing to quality reductions due to poor storage and post-harvest 
technologies.  
Market & institutional issues fresh fruit and vegetable promotion 
• Access to business development and financial services: Government and civil society, 
together with exporters and processors, play key roles in the development of fresh 
fruit and vegetable production and marketing by smallholders. Capital and risk 
constraints for smallholders, as well as for their business organizations, are key 
factors that limit the adoption of fresh vegetable crops by smallholders because these 
crops generally are much more costly to produce per hectare than traditional crops, 
and most growers require credit to finance their production. RCEs in the fresh fruit 
and vegetable sector require relatively large endowments of financial, physical, 
human and social assets. Success for growers will depend on their ability to access 
diverse markets and respond promptly to changes in market conditions. Improving 
market information systems for horticultural crops and facilitating smallholders’ 
access to credit are essential components of a strategy. In addition, targeted 
subsidies may be crucial in promoting decisions to invest in fresh fruits and vegetable 
production and to persist in growing them. For example, improved access to 
irrigation can help smallholders increased adoption and sustain cultivation of NTAEs. 
• Growth of Supermarkets: The proliferation of supermarkets in the Caribbean basin 
and elsewhere creates both challenges and opportunities for smallholders. 
Supermarkets may contribute to a higher demand for horticultural products and 
increase expectations for quality, safety, and presentation, while simultaneously 
excluding smallholders from participating in supermarket procurements and contracts. 
                                          
25 In 2002, the CGIAR system (including CIAT, Colombia) invested $118 million in cereals, compared to 15.7 
million in fruits and vegetables (Weinberger & Lumpkin 2007). At CATIE (Costa Rica), only 2 of the 12 thematic 
groups relates to fresh fruits and vegetables and overall funds available for related R&D remain far below those 
available for coffee, cocoa, and bananas. Not a single upcoming project listed by the Caribbean Development 
Bank (Barbados) relates to fresh fruits or vegetables (see http://www.caribank.org/). While IICA (Costa Rica) 
has invested in market intelligence and production technologies for fresh fruits or vegetables in the Caribbean, 
a review of their website suggests that the importance of fresh fruits and vegetables vis-à-vis other programs 
may be small (see www.iica.int/Eng/). 
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As highlighted previously, relatively little is known about how to facilitate viable 
institutional arrangements between smallholder fruits and vegetable producers with 
the tourism industry Successful production and marketing of horticultural crops 
requires an understanding of the fundamentals of market structure, conduct and 
performance. 
• Health and safety conditions: An integrated food safety system for production and 
public health is necessary to manage supply chain quality and safety and to require 
exporters to coordinate more closely with producers in each country. A model based 
on the implementation of effective and demonstrable quality control systems (i.e., 
HACCP-based or alternative food safety risk management systems) is the most 
effective means of reducing food safety hazards and sustaining a presence in 
demanding export markets. In most cases public sector intervention from national 
governments will be necessary, with support from bilateral and multilateral 
organizations such as the EU (García Martínez & Poole 2004). The new EU-ACP EPA 
makes mention of SPS issues but no commitment to provide assistance to upgrade 
Caribbean capacity to comply with food safety and standards environmental and 
socially quality management (CTA 2008).  
 
Conclusions  
Based on this review of literature and three case studies a picture emerges regarding the 
conditions under which agricultural development strategies in the Caribbean region have 
succeeded or failed, as well as what changes should be made in the future to ensure 
increased likelihood of success from social, economic, and environmental perspectives. 
Factors which have led to successful integration of smallholders into globalizing markets 
for agricultural products include: 
• Small-scale advantages: Identification of markets where smallholders have a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis larger scale producers is critical, as highlighted in 
the cases of organic and fair trade cocoa from Belize and the Dominican Republic, 
fresh herbs from Jamaica, fair trade bananas from St. Lucia and the Dominican 
Republic, and fresh vegetable exports from Guatemala, among others. In all these 
cases, production systems demanded relative large labor inputs, careful attention to 
processing and product standards, and formation of new institutional arrangements 
with buyers and processors. Under these circumstances, smallholders may develop a 
sustainable competitive advantage, provided other conditions are met. Elsewhere, 
large scale production is an advantage. 
• Small-scale disadvantages: In cases where production is not inherently favorable to 
smallholders, such as in the case of the plantation crops, due mainly to issues of 
scale in production and processing (such as the case of citrus in Belize), smallholders 
can still be effectively incorporated into production and marketing systems provided 
that complex and demanding institutional conditions can be satisfied. These involve 
collective organization and enterprise, contracting mechanisms and sophisticated 
management systems. Opportunities exist for smallholders in such markets when 1) 
government and non-government organizations have made a clear commitment to 
promoting smallholders’ interests; and 2) there is preferential access to a given 
market, for example, tariff-free access to US markets for frozen concentrated orange 
juice (FCOJ) under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). As the experience in Belize 
demonstrates, development under these circumstances can result in large benefits 
for smallholders; however, the process itself is one of several years or more and 
especially risky in nature, due to large fixed investments and dependence on political 
and market conditions in major producing countries.   
• Buyer-provided services (embedded services): As highlighted in the case of cocoa in 
Belize, the provision of external support services may come through the private 
sector. A desirable strategy is to involve a ‘lead firm’ in building inclusive supply 
systems and providing business support, as in DFID’s ‘lead firm approach’ to building 
sustainable value chains. The Belize case also shows that public-private partnerships 
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can facilitate the upgrading process, providing funds for long-term, high risk 
upgrading investment by smallholders and their private sector partners.  
• Government/project provided services: Private sector provision of business services 
and quality control and enhancement systems is a necessary but insufficient 
mechanism to overcome market development and penetration barriers: physical and 
institutional infrastructure and capacity building are also a public sector responsibility. 
Long-term accompaniment provided by government and NGOs was critical in the 
three cases examined in this report. This is especially true for the case of fresh 
vegetables in Guatemala and citrus production and processing in Belize. Without such 
assistance, the Guatemalan fresh vegetable sector or the Belizean citrus sector would 
most likely not have emerged at all. In this respect, external services were critical for 
linking with markets, improving quality, obtaining certification, building social capital 
among smallholders, developing technical capacities for primary production and 
processing, and developing effective administration and export procedures. Capacity 
building and development of an entrepreneurial culture may begin at school, and 
consideration needs to be given to adapting educational curricula to include 
vocational content appropriate to the local rural context (Poole and Alvarez Simán 
2006; Poole et al 2006). 
• Innovative financing models: IFAD and other organizations have experience in 
delivering financial support to projects through competitive tendering by intermediary 
organizations and beneficiaries. An appropriate balance of loans and grants may need 
to be considered. Also, by providing investment finance in the form of equity, a 
financial institution provides capital in return for a share in ownership and profits, 
and some level of management, of a new venture. Various advantages might be 
expected, including fostering innovation within donor and support organisations 
(Poole and Penrose-Buckley 2006). 
• Training and capacity building: High endowments of social and human capital among 
smallholders are critical for the effective organization of smallholders into rural 
community enterprises. The development of TCGA and Cuatro Pinos in Belize and 
Guatemala, respectively, provide illustrative examples, as well as the organization of 
smallholder citrus growers in the Citrus Growers Association (with direct support from 
the Government of Belize). In some cases, NGOs or international buyers have been 
able to promote human capital development over time where initial endowments are 
especially low, such as the case of TCGA in Belize. Where social and human capital 
for RCE development are especially lacking, such as the case of chayote and melon 
exports from Costa Rica and Honduras, respectively, smallholder participation 
declined over time in response to changes in price, increased production costs, and 
increased quality and safety requirements.  
 
In the context of this report, several factors were also identified which have effectively 
slowed or blocked the incorporation of smallholders into non-traditional agricultural 
markets, both at home and abroad. These include: 
• Development of an entrepreneurial culture: Business organization by smallholders 
and their participation in value chain development have not been taken seriously by 
most governments or donors. Enterprise development can be divided into three 
phases: incipient or start-up, consolidation, and maturity, whereby the first two 
phases may take anything between 10-25 years each, depending on the local 
capacities available at the onset, availability of direct support services, and overall 
enabling conditions. In the context of this report, no single RCE can be considered 
mature. The organic cocoa enterprise TCGA in Belize can be considered in the start-
up phase after roughly 10 years of existence, while other RCEs, such as BANELINO 
(organic banana from the Dominican Republic) and Cuatro Pinos (fresh vegetables 
from Guatemala), can be considered in the consolidation phase. The long duration 
until maturity of smallholder-led enterprise development represents a major obstacle 
to increasing the benefits to NTAEs for smallholders in the Caribbean.  
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• Investment in transformation and knowledge systems: The general lack of 
investment in production and processing technologies for agricultural products for 
which smallholders may have a competitive advantage continues to be a major 
constraint to promoting NTAEs among smallholders. This is a major constraint in the 
overall development of the fresh fruits and vegetable sector in Jamaica, for example, 
and affects the region as a whole. Moreover, the negative impacts of insufficient 
production and pest management technologies tend to be hardest felt by 
smallholders. Regional research centers such as CARDI, CATIE, CIAT, IICA can play 
an important role in this area, but research on fresh fruits and vegetables, as 
opposed to traditional export commodities, has not been a priority in their funding 
programs. In the case of organic production, there is need to access to low-cost 
technologies to increase productivity at the farm level and deal with the threat of 
plant diseases, as illustrated in the case of cocoa production in Belize.   
• Systems strategies: Approaches to NTAE development in the Caribbean tend to be 
carried out with little attention to 1) local resources and capacities for production and 
marketing, 2) relations along the value chains and 3) need for specialized technical, 
business development and financial services for smallholders and their collective 
enterprises. Overall, the private sector has not featured prominently in strategies for 
NTAE development. There is considerable evidence to suggest that traditional 
approaches to NTAE development based on mobilization of supply in response to a 
given ‘market opportunity’ (identified on the basis of national, regional or 
international supply and demand conditions) holds little promise for long-term 
development involving smallholders. A more balanced approach is required whereby 
the definition of market opportunities takes into account the resources and capacities 
available for production and marketing at the household and community levels, as 
well as the possible tradeoffs at the household level for increased investments in new 
production and marketing efforts.  
• Coherent policies: The political-legal framework for the development of NTAEs in the 
Caribbean requires attention. The case of Belize highlights the positive impacts of 
government policies when a given NTAE is of strategic importance, both politically 
and economically. The Government of Belize played a key role in ensuring the 
incorporation of smallholders into citrus production and processing. However, the 
GoB has been much less attentive to the development of organic cocoa production, 
which is carried out in a remote section of Belize by mainly indigenous producers. For 
example, there has been an unwillingness to tackle the difficult issue of land tenure 
among the Mayan communities. The development of effective agriculture-tourism 
links in the small island states of the Caribbean requires active involvement of 
government in reducing costs of production and marketing, providing incentives for 
local procurement, and stimulating dialogue between the tourism industry and RCEs. 
In general, there is need for much greater dialogue among stakeholders in the 
Caribbean for the development of smallholder-based agriculture. Integration of 
policies of different public sector bodies – agriculture with education and with 
information and telecommunications – are examples of other necessary cross-
sectoral linkages. 
• Inter-organizational coordination: While development projects have provided critical 
stimulus for the development of NTAE sectors, the support has often been 
discontinuous and poorly focused. The typical situation enterprises face is that there 
is chiefly one service provider – typically an NGO or development project – that 
provides a more or less complete service offer as long as funding is available. This 
implies that there is no continuity in service delivery for more than three to four 
years, if that long. Moreover, service providers may compete among each other or, 
worse, pursue conflicting objectives and approaches, rather than complementing 
their service offer. At the same time, enterprises do not receive all the services 
needed, as their providers may be specialized in certain services without being 
capable of providing the mix of technical, business development and financial 
services that enterprises typically need during both the start-up and consolidation 
phases.  
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What do these findings imply for the design-phase of the ‘EU-ACP All Agricultural 
Commodities Programme’? We offer the following recommendations:  
• Selection of chains requires attention to supply, as well as demand, factors: The 
selection of products should be based as much on the resources and capacities of a 
given community or communities, as on the overall supply and demand conditions in 
a given market. Focusing on a single product in a given community is unlikely to 
have major impact on poverty, as clearly demonstrated by the complex livelihood 
strategies pursued by cocoa producers in southern Belize. Rather, a ‘multi-chain’ 
approach is called for, whereby a range of products and services are identified which 
are complementary to existing resources and capacities of smallholders, and respond 
to existing market opportunities at the local, regional and international levels. CATIE 
has recently published a methodology on multi-chain approaches for the design for 
rural development interventions (see Junkin et al. 2005), which could serve as a 
basis for discussion. The methodology calls for extensive dialogue between 
development projects, smallholders, and downstream value chain actors in the 
identification of potentially viable market opportunities.   
• Value chain approaches are essential, but caution is required: As highlighted in this 
report and elsewhere, there have been undoubted successes in the upgrading of 
smallholders’ capacities for positioning in higher value markets. However, little is 
known about the long-term sustainability of such efforts or the returns when 
measured against the costs of support provided by external agencies. Efforts to link 
smallholders with higher value chains (eg tourism, niche markets), should examine 
closely the costs and benefits, especially the likely sustainability after Programme 
support is withdrawn. In general, there is an urgent need for a better understanding 
of the potential tradeoffs associated with value chain approaches at the household 
and community level. At the household level, tradeoffs may arise when upgrading 
investments require rural households to reduce current investments in activities for 
income generation or household maintenance. At community level, tradeoffs may 
arise when upgrading comes at the expense of sustainable resource management. In 
addition, little is known about minimum levels of asset endowments required for 
value chain development at the household, enterprise and community levels.  
• Directly address the constraints related to the political-legal framework: Given the 
strong presence of international development agencies participating in the 
Programme, and working in close collaboration the national and regional 
organizations, it may have a unique opportunity to influence with design of 
institutions that can support value chain development (at national, regional and 
international levels) by smallholders in the Caribbean. Areas that should be 
addressed include market information, access to technical, business and financial 
services, export quality certification, agricultural research and development, laws and 
regulations concerning smallholder business organization and development, and risk 
mitigation.  
• Invest in improving the quality and coverage of external services: The overall service 
environment for NTAE promotion among smallholders does not exist in the Caribbean: 
services are incomplete, insufficiently focused, rarely coordinated among different 
service providers, and usually without clear entry and exit strategy. The EU-ACP 
could play a role in improving the impact of technical, business development and 
financial services of smallholder and RCE development, as well as fostering better 
coordination among different service providers to ensure long-term strategies and 
commitment, and avoid duplication and service gaps. The Diploma in Rural Enterprise 
Development, a joint initiative between CATIE and CIAT, as well as the INCAE-CATIE 
Masters in International Agribusiness Management (MAIM) can help to address the 
need for upgrading the services of BDS providers through innovation contexts and 
tools for RCE development.  
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• Extensive dialogue and coordination is required to improve potential for scaling up: 
There is urgent need to identify through multi-stakeholder platforms (smallholders, 
businesses, national and regional research and development centers, government 
agencies, donors, NGOs, etc.) the opportunities and constraints for:  
 
o improving trust between smallholders and buyers and processors by addressing 
misunderstanding and suspicion and opportunities for synergies through 
frequent contact and dialogue 
o increasing the impacts of technical, business development and financial services 
and promoting performance-based remuneration mechanisms for service 
delivery through innovative payment mechanisms (eg vouchers or co-funded 
measures)  
o supporting research for increased understanding of successful cases and sound 
practices of rural enterprise development by smallholders, the underlying 
critical success factors, and the potential for scaling up 
o addressing existing potential conflicts in resource management, value chain 
development, access to services, political-legal framework 
o building a common understanding for the identification of successful cases and 
sound practices of RCE development in the Caribbean, including the underlying 
critical success factors and the potential for scaling up.  
• Linking with regional initiatives for increased scaling up: The ‘Jagdeo Initiative’ is one 
regional agricultural development initiative and under the leadership of the President 
of Guyana (supported by IICA and CTA) aims to ‘build on past efforts in a more 
coherent, comprehensive and long-term development framework that takes into 
consideration the changed global environment and creates an enabling economic and 
business environment for competitive and sustainable agriculture and rural 
development’ (CARICOM 2006). It aims to overcome major binding constraints that 
are consistent with the substance of this report, including: limited financing and 
inadequate new investments, outdated and inefficient agricultural health and food 
safety systems, inadequate research and development, fragmented and disorganized 
private sector, weak integrated information systems, and lack of skilled and quality 
human resources. In addition, tapping into ongoing work by regional organizations, 
such as Centre for Technical Cooperation and Caribbean Agribusiness Association, as 
well as Central American-based organizations with considerable experience in 
production systems, rural enterprise development, and value chain integration by 
smallholders (eg CATIE, CIAT, and IICA) offers potential synergies. 
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